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INTRODUCTION
At 9:00 AM on August 28, 2015, Dr. Richard Sackler sat for a deposition related to Purdue Pharma’s opioid marketing.1 In the lawyer’s
office, with a backdrop of books, he answered questions posed by
Tyler Thompson, a private lawyer working with the Office of the Kentucky Attorney General. A lawyer representing the Attorney General’s office was there, as well as five lawyers representing Purdue and
Abbott Labs, the defendants in the lawsuit brought by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As deposition questioning began, one of Purdue’s
lawyers ascertained that portions of the deposition would be designated confidential. Donald Strauber, a lawyer with Chadbourne and
Parke, representing Sackler and Purdue, interrupted the second ques* Burch is the Fuller E. Callaway Chair of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law;
Lahav is the Ellen Ash Peters Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law.
We are grateful to Seth Endo, Nora Engstrom, Diego Zambrano, and participants in the Clifford
Symposium for helpful feedback.
1. We often refer to Purdue Pharma as “Purdue.”
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tion and said, “Mr. Thompson, before you get started, I’d just like to
note that I expect we will be designating portions of this transcript as
confidential pursuant to the order.”2 Thompson turned to the deputy
attorney general who was sitting in on the deposition, “Is that correct,
Mitchell?”3 “Yeah,” he answered, “they can designate portions confidential, and then there’s provisions about challenging them.”4 Having
established confidentiality, the deposition continued.
Sackler tried to argue that although his company had worked to
create the impression that its opioid products were as effective but less
“powerful” or “strong” or “potent” than morphine to avoid the stigma
associated with the latter drug, the company did not mean to imply
that the drug was in fact safer or less potent, powerful, and strong than
the kinds of painkillers that doctors were careful to prescribe only for
extreme pain.5 Watching the deposition, one walks away with the
sense that Sackler would have been a terrible witness at trial.6 He was
trying to diminish his and his company’s role in the crisis, to underplay
the extent that the company pushed its drug with implications that
were untrue and unstudied, to deny manipulating doctors, and to engage in word play, all to avoid what was painfully clear to everyone
else: Purdue put profits over patient safety. He was unsuccessful, coming off as prevaricating and a bit callous. Four months later, Purdue
and the Commonwealth of Kentucky settled the civil suit for $24
million.7
As their initial discussion indicated, the parties agreed to a Qualified Protective Order, which the court entered at the start of the litigation on December 4, 2013. In 2016, The Boston Globe Life Sciences
Media L.L.C. (known as “STAT”) intervened in the Kentucky suit
and sought to lift the protective order.8 On a theory of the commonlaw right of access to pretrial discovery materials involving expendi2. Deposition of Dr. Richard Sackler at 11, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 07CI-01303 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 2015).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 249, 251.
6. As Alan Morrison has pointed out, “[m]ost trial lawyers know that the first time a witness
is under oath, the testimony is fresher, and things come out which, upon reflection, are not
always said on the second and third deposition.” Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Public Interest in Disclosure: Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV.
109, 116 (1989).
7. David Armstrong, Watch Richard Sackler Deny His Family’s Role in the Opioid Crisis,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/watch-richardsackler-deny-his-familys-role-in-the-opioid-crisis.
8. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Bos. Globe Life Scis. Media, LLC, No. 2016-CA-000710-MR, at *3
(Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).
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ture (or in this case, receipt) of public funds, the Kentucky court
agreed to make the deposition and other discovery materials public in
32 days. But Purdue appealed. In late August 2019, four years after
the deposition was taken, the Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to
hear the case, allowing the deposition and related documents to be
publicized.9 For the first time, people who were not in the room that
day could watch Richard Sackler try to explain away his role and his
company’s role in the opioid crisis. For the first time, people could
read emails showing the marketing campaign that sought to take away
the stigma and association with morphine and end-of-life pain, and
expand the use of these powerful medicines far beyond the extraordinary pain for which doctors prescribed them in the past.
Today we can watch this deposition online because of cooperation
between STAT and the investigative news outlet ProPublica. Absent
STAT’s intervention, it is likely this information would have remained
hidden forever.
Now, turn back the clock to the 1990s, the same time that Purdue
was ramping up its opioid sales. The subject is another public-health
crisis, tobacco litigation. On May 12, 1994, Professor Stanton Glantz, a
leading expert on tobacco-control research and a well-known antismoking activist, cautiously opened a large, anonymous box containing tobacco company documents dating back to the 1950s.10 In lieu of
a return address was a simple signature: Mr. Butts. Mr. Butts turned
out to be a whistleblower of sorts, a man named Dr. Merrell Williams,
who was a former paralegal for the law firm that represented the
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W).11 In 1988, it was
Williams who sifted through millions of B&W’s discovery documents,
marking inflammatory material as critical risks for the company.12 Although the law firm laid Williams off in 1992, he covertly stashed
thousands of the documents he’d reviewed. A heavy smoker himself,
Williams suffered from heart problems a year later. He attributed
those problems to the many disturbing findings he unearthed during
that document review and threatened to sue the law firm unless they
settled with him. Instead, the firm sued him for theft.13
The cat was out of the bag by then. Professor Glantz and his colleagues used those thousands of documents to publish an exposé, The
9. Armstrong, supra note 7.
10. K.M. Cummings & R.W. Pollay, Exposing Mr Butts’ tricks of the trade, TOBACCO CONTROL, March 1, 2002, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL208.txt

348

unknown

Seq: 4

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:48

[Vol. 70:345

Cigarette Papers.14 The box of 4,000 documents that Dr. Glantz received turned out to be the tip of the iceberg. In 1998, the Attorney
General of Minnesota, represented by private lawyers, announced a
historic settlement with tobacco companies.15 The settlement was notable not just for its amount, $6.5 billion, but for the Minnesota attorneys’ steadfast refusal to keep tobacco company documents out of the
public eye even though doing so substantially reduced their attorneys’
fees.16 After waging a years-long discovery battle with the tobacco defendants that entailed a trip all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Minnesota attorneys agreed to settle only if some thirty-five million once-secret documents were kept in a public repository.17
When a group of state attorneys general later settled with tobacco
companies for $206 billion, their Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA) added to this count through its own transparency provisions.
These provisions required tobacco defendants to apply to dissolve any
outstanding protective orders, post all of those formerly secret documents on a website that they had to maintain for twelve years, and
establish an independent foundation dedicated to educating the public
on tobacco’s risks.18
So, what began as 4,000 pages of leaked documents eventually expanded into over ninety million pages that have been accessed by
more than seven million users, and have led to “1,059 scientific publications, media reports, documentaries and government papers[.]”19
14. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
15. Pam Belluck, Tobacco Companies Settle a Suit With Minnesota for $6.5 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/09/us/tobacco-companies-settle-a-suitwith-minnesota-for-6.5-billion.html.
16. See generally DEBORAH CAULFIELD RYBAK & DAVID PHELPS, SMOKED: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL 385 (1998); Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good,
Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2097–98 (2004). For an extensive look at the legal battle
over whether the documents were privileged, see generally Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of
Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
477 (1999); Roberta B. Walburn, The Role of the Once-Confidential Industry Documents, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 431 (1999).
17. Richard D. Hurt et al., Open Doorway to Truth: Legacy of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial,
84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 446, 448 (2009).
18. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of a Settlement Agreement Including Broad Transparency Provisions in the Interest of Future Research at 10–11, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2019).
19. Stanton Glantz, Lawsuits against companies aren’t just about getting money. They’re about
revealing the truth, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/09/lawsuits-against-companies-arent-just-about-getting-money-theyre-about-revealing-truth/. See also Hurt et al., supra note 17, at 450. (“During the past 10 years, more than
500 publications (453 peer-reviewed journal articles, 32 books or book chapters, and 51 reports)
relating to the tobacco documents have been published across diverse disciplines.”). Those documents are housed on the web at Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, UCSF, https://
www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/.
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This research ranges from ethics, marketing, and economics, to regional issues and youth activities. 20 Two science historians even relied
on the repository to show how the same experts who defended the
tobacco industry also questioned the global-warming evidence and developed similar campaigns to mislead the public on both issues.21
While public-health advocates and scholars alike have criticized how
little of the MSA settlement money actually went toward healthcare
measures related to smoking,22 there is widespread agreement that
these transparency requirements have had a long-lasting, positive
impact.23
In this Article, we argue that information produced in mass-tort litigation, like Dr. Sackler’s deposition and the tobacco documents, is
often a common good. By this we mean that it is useful to society—the
commons—but it is also a good that can be commodified and sold for
a secrecy premium. We use the terminology common good, rather
than public good, because information produced in litigation does not
quite fit the definition of public good as that term is used in economics. In the economic literature, a “public good” is typically defined as
one that the government must provide because there are insufficient
market incentives for private participants to do so.24 Embedded in this
concept is a collective-action problem: there is no market incentive to
provide a good that benefits everyone equally.25 This disincentive has
20. Hurt et al., supra note 17, at 450.
21. See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY: MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING (2011); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of a Settlement Agreement Including Broad
Transparency Provisions in the Interest of Future Research at 13, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2019); Hurt et al., supra note 17, at 450.
22. See, e.g., BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT THE 1998
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER, TOBACCO FREE KIDS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://
www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/settlement/FY2019/
2018_State_Report.pdf (“Over the past 20 years, from FY2000 to FY2019, the states have spent
just 2.6 percent of their total tobacco-generated revenue on tobacco prevention and cessation
programs.”); Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its
Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later: Lessons for Physicians About Health Policy Making, 137
CHEST J. 692, 695–97 (2010) (citing studies and concluding that “the states have, at best, a ‘mixed
record’ when it comes to using the funds for originally intended purposes” as well as observing
that “there is a growing consensus that ‘the public lost a golden opportunity to improve its
health’ when the MSA was enacted”).
23. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation,
73 STAN. L. REV. 285, 344 (2021); Glantz, supra note 19. See also Hurt et al., supra note 17, at
450; Jennifer D. Oliva, Opioid Multidistrict Litigation Secrecy, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 691 (2019).
24. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2623
(1995). For more information on this concept, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
25. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006); Luban, supra note 24, at 2623
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been defined as a problem of “jointness of supply and impossibility of
exclusion.”26 Classic examples of public goods are fresh air, streetlights, and lighthouses. The corollary collective-action problem is doing nothing in hopes of free riding on others’ hard work.27 If anyone
can recreate a secret sauce recipe once published, you might prefer
not to develop your own and instead to wait for Aaron Franklin to
publish his.28
Whether something is a excludable or not is endogenous to law.
Information can be protected by intellectual property rules so that it is
legally excludable. In litigation, information is excludable when it can
be the subject of protective orders and secret settlements, which are
enforceable by courts.29 When it is excludable in this way, it has a
value: a “secrecy premium.”
Information revealed in lawsuits adjudicated in taxpayer-funded
courts often benefits society as a whole, but there is no incentive for
private parties to reveal it. So long as information is “excludable”—
that is, when it can be hidden—it has value to the litigation participants. The Sackler deposition had a value to both sides to the extent
that it was secret. To the defendant, this value was that it could put off
or even prevail in future suits if the information remained private. To
the plaintiff, the secret information increased the price that Purdue
was willing to pay to settle. The settlement in turn kept the deposition
secret until investigative journalists intervened. Left to their own devices, neither party had an incentive to publicize the information obtained in pretrial discovery. The more explosive the information, the
greater that secrecy premium becomes.
Worse yet, it is possible that without excludability there is no private incentive to obtain information. If a lawyer thinks she cannot
profitably settle a filed case absent secrecy, and secrecy is forbidden,
(“Economists define a public good as a beneficial product that cannot be provided to one consumer without making it available to all (or at least many others). The textbook example is a
lighthouse . . .”).
26. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982); Rubenstein, supra note 25.
27. Rubenstein, supra note 25, at 711.
28. See generally AARON FRANKLIN & JORDAN MACKAY, FRANKLIN BARBECUE: A MEAT
SMOKING MANIFESTO (2015).
29. There are analogues to this observation in other areas, such as innovation law. See Oren
Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (2009) (“In the absence of property rights in the innovation, covenants
not to compete (CNCs) become critical in determining incentives and overall efficiency.”); see
also Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, NAT’L
BUREAU ECON. RES. 609, 609 (1962). Information economics is mostly concerned with competition as a catalyst for knowledge production. In the case of information being publicized or not
through the medium of the court system, competition is not so much an issue.
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she may not sue and obtain the information at all. This is a serious
problem, but we do not intend to resolve it here. Rather, our focus is
on situations in which information is revealed in discovery, remains in
parties’ hands, and there is an incentive to keep it secret on both sides
for different reasons. We also do not address situations where the individual has access to secret information as a result of being a victim
of the wrongdoing. Our paradigm cases are tobacco or opioids: publichealth situations in which the information was disclosed in the course
of litigation, could not have otherwise been obtained, and the question of whether that information will be hidden or revealed is on the
table.
Courts can decide if information like the Sackler deposition is to be
a common good, one that in the end will have to be made accessible
for society’s unified benefit. By the same token, they can privatize it.
Both choices have costs and benefits, and these have been amply discussed in the scholarly literature.30 The relationship of these concerns
to the larger theoretical questions of the procedural law, however, has
yet to be analyzed.
This Article intervenes in three theoretical debates in civil procedure that are implicated by the question of access to information produced in litigation for the public welfare. The first debate concerns the
question of what courts are for: dispute resolution or law declaration.
In this analysis, we adjust this dichotomy to a tri-chotomy: courts are
sites of dispute resolution, law declaration, and truth revelation. The
second is the debate over the best way to get to the truth: secrecy or
publicity? Here, we remind readers that secrecy was once associated
with truth-telling and further unravel the implications of this history
for today’s mass-tort cases. The third is the issue of trans-substantivity:
given its goals, should all litigation be governed by the same set of
general rules? If some lawsuits involve information that affects the
public good, and others do not, these differences may require courts
to balance interests differently with respect to secrecy and
transparency.
To unpack these three interrelated questions, we begin with an
overview of secrecy in mass torts and explain the importance of information produced in large-scale lawsuits involving drugs, medical devices, and toxins. Consequently, Part I introduces the long-standing
debate over the pros and cons of publicizing information about the
30. See generally Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867 (2007); Alexander C. Egilman et al., Confidentiality Orders and Public Interest in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 292
(2020).
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defendant’s underlying wrongdoing. Part II describes secrecy’s legal
landscape, focusing on information produced in the pretrial phase of
litigation rather than on questions surrounding settlement negotiations, settlement amounts, or even attorneys’ fees. We explain how the
same smoking-gun documents are subject to varying legal standards at
different points in the life of a lawsuit, and how they could remain
hidden altogether should a case settle privately before the court adjudicates the merits. We likewise explore who will resist applying relatively clear disclosure rules in multidistrict litigation (also known as
MDL)—and why.
In Part III, we reconsider the history of pretrial litigation and its
three purposes: dispute resolution, law declaration, and truth revelation. We aim to help scholars and courts better understand the assumptions underlying our current regime, both to grasp how we got
here and as a step towards re-envisioning the rules governing information in litigation. We investigate an untold history of discovery’s publicity to show that many of our assumptions about what is public and
what is private is historically contingent and, even, perhaps, accidental, as are our assumptions of the best way to arrive at the truth. This
part likewise illustrates how legal rules raise different considerations
for different actors with different legal claims and suggests that courts
prioritize litigation’s information-production role over competing litigant-autonomy values in lawsuits like the Opiate litigation that have a
significant bearing on public health and safety.31 We propose a
nuanced approach to confidentiality that takes all of these considerations into account, even if it undermines the system’s commitment to
trans-substantivity in practice.
I. THE TRANSPARENCY DEBATE
Revelations from civil discovery that affect public health are important. We begin by recounting the traditional benefits of information
touching on public health and safety. To that list, we add that litigation’s information-producing role can also have enormous but amorphous secondary effects, prompting legislation and contributing to
significant cultural shifts. Nevertheless, secrecy has its virtues. Secrecy
can promote truthfulness and may result in larger, quicker settlements. Mass torts can pit litigation goals of truth revelation and dispute resolution against one another, forcing judges, litigants, and the
public to weigh and prioritize competing values.
31. See generally In re Nat’l Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio 2020).
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A. Benefits of Transparency
Public access to courts is a fundamental principle of our justice system.32 Transparency goes hand in hand with the courts’ legitimacy.
Deciding cases in secret breeds mistrust.33 Public access is also important because the information revealed through lawsuits can be critical
to decision-makers and citizens. For example, litigation revealed how
some Remington rifles would go off without anyone pressing the trigger.34 Suits against a fast-food restaurant that served undercooked
hamburgers tainted with E. coli that severely injured several children
ultimately led to new federal standards for cooking meat.35 And similar concerns led the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
and the Consumer Product Safety Commission to recommend that the
manufacturers they regulate share information often hidden from
them under sweeping protective orders in litigation.36
Defective, mass-market products, drugs, and medical devices can
harm users on a broad scale. The costs of uncovering the defect can be
quite high. Would-be lawsuits may never come to fruition, for taking
on a Goliath corporation is not only daunting—it may be economic
suicide for plaintiffs’ lawyers.37 When information on wrongdoing re32. For a brief history of the public in courts, see Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J.
2804, 2818–35 (2015).
33. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)
(“The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (open courts assure “that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned,” while discouraging “perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on
secret bias or partiality”); Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[C]ourts have recognized that exercise of the [common-law] right helps the public
keep a watchful eye on public institutions, and the activities of government.”).
34. Scott Cohn, Remington hid dangers of controversial trigger: Documents, CNBC (Dec. 8,
2015, 5:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/08/remington-under-fire-the-reckoning.html;
Oliva, supra note 23, at 693–95.
35. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, POISONED: THE TRUE STORY OF THE DEADLY E. Coli Outbreak That Changed the Way Americans Eat (2011).
36. Those guidelines, however, are not binding and limited to the industries they regulate. See
NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015–01: Recommended Best Practices for Protective
Orders and Settlement Agreements in Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,026, 13,026 (Mar. 11,
2016) (recommending that litigants “include a specific provision in any protective order or settlement agreement that provides for disclosure of relevant motor vehicle safety information to
NHTSA” because of the importance of “safety-related information developed or discovered in
private litigation”); CPSC Litigation Guidance and Recommended Best Practices for Protective
Orders and Settlement Agreements in Private Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,023, 87,023 (Dec.
2, 2016).
37. For example, Jan Schlichtmann, the lawyer made famous by the book and movie “A Civil
Action” went bankrupt as a result of that litigation. See Paula Span, One Man’s Poisons, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1999/02/22/one-mans-
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mains hidden, any person harmed by the same misconduct must
reinvent the wheel and waste judicial resources by conducting the
same discovery, litigating the same discovery disputes, and fighting for
access to the same documents. The process wastes time and resources
for courts and litigants alike.38 Furthermore, in some cases, sealing
information obtained in lawsuits from public view prevents both government regulators and people who have been harmed from discovering the cause of that harm, which makes reform or even just holding
the wrongdoer accountable that much more difficult.39
By contrast, once pioneering citizens and attorneys expose wrongdoing, they lower information barriers and make follow-on suits not
only less risky, but also economically viable. This was true in the case
of the asbestos industry’s cover-up of asbestos’ carcinogenic effects,
the lead content in the Flint River, and the GM Ignition Switch Litigation.40 In that last case, without a push by one family—the Meltons—
the information leading to thousands of lawsuits might have remained
secret.
As Brooke Melton drove her Chevy Cobalt down the highway, it
suddenly cut off, sending her into the fast-moving water of Picketts
Mill Creek and fatally breaking her neck.41 Brooke’s death in 2010
was far from GM’s first fatality. Four years earlier, eighteen-year-old
Natasha Weigel and her friend Amy Rademaker both died when
Natasha’s Cobalt similarly cut off, resulting in a crash and failure of
the airbags to deploy.42 Although the police report attributed their
deaths to the faulty ignition switch, neither family could find an attorney to take their case because Wisconsin capped pain-and-suffering
poisons/e415463a-e931-4993-a1d8-3743add86a36/ (describing Schlichtmann’s bankruptcy and the
closure of his firm after the Woburn litigation).
38. Morrison, supra note 6, at 115.
39. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
469, 511 n.171 (citing Greg Rushford, Pfizer’s Telltale Heart Valve; Secrecy Strategy in Tatters as
Questions Mount, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 26, 1990).
40. See generally Max Blau, No Accident: Inside GM’s deadly ignition switch scandal, ATLANTA MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/no-accident-insidegms-deadly-ignition-switch-scandal/; Bill Richards, New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-Up of
Effects on Workers, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/12/new-data-on-asbestos-indicate-cover-up-of-effects-on-workers/028209a4-fac94e8b-a24c-50a93985a35d/; Merrit Kennedy, Led-Laced Water In Flint: A Step-By-Step Look At
The Makings Of A Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-acrisis.
41. Blau, supra note 40.
42. Barry Meier & Hilary Stout, Victims of G.M. Deadly Defect Fall Through Legal Cracks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/business/victims-of-gm-deadlydefect-fall-through-legal-cracks.html?smid=url-share.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL208.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 11

13-DEC-21

INFORMATION FOR THE COMMON GOOD

10:48

355

damages at $350,000.43 The cost of prosecuting the suit exceeded the
possible recovery.
By 2014, at least forty-two other people had died from GM ignitionrelated defects.44 Those who sued were silenced by settlements requiring them to keep all information obtained in discovery secret.45 Even
when attorney Lance Cooper uncovered the defect while working on
Brooke Melton’s case, GM offered $5 million to settle, but insisted
that the documents remain confidential—at least while the suit against
the dealer who had inspected the car days before the crash
continued.46
When GM finally recalled the ignition switches, it included only a
fraction of the affected cars. Cooper wrote a letter on the Meltons’
behalf to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration explaining that the recall was insufficient.47 He also alerted national media
outlets.48 Only then did GM recall all of the defective vehicles, only
then did Congress initiate hearings, and only then did federal regulators fine GM $35 million for its failings.49 “One of the important issues
for the Meltons was accountability,” Cooper explained.50 They “simply wanted the truth and for no one else to suffer a similar loss.”51
As the GM example suggests, lawsuits can generate information for
the common good. When made publicly accessible, the information
can make its way to regulatory bodies, legislative entities, and other
potential plaintiffs.52 As one of us has explained previously, “litigation
cannot make up for management dysfunction of the type that was
prevalent at GM,” but “[w]ithout punitive damages in West Virginia
or Georgia [where Cooper sued on the Meltons’ behalf], those cases
would never have been brought, the plaintiffs’ expert who diagnosed
the design flaw never hired, and the truth might have taken longer to
surface (if it surfaced at all).”53
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Blau, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Bill Vlasic, G.M. Settles Switch Suit, Avoiding Depositions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/14/business/general-motors-ignition-flaw-victimsettlement.html.
51. Id.; see also Mike Spector et al., How secrecy in U.S. courts hobbles the regulators meant to
protect the public, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-regulators/ (“ ‘We thought that people needed to know. There
were still people out there driving those cars,’ Beth Melton told Reuters.”).
52. See Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 23; Morrison, supra note 6, at 114–15.
53. ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 49 (2017).
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When made public, information produced in discovery allows the
press and researchers to study the documents, connect the dots, unmask health risks, shed light on regulatory failures, and pressure companies to make safer products.54 As one in-depth study on the
dynamics between court records and journalists concluded: “legal
sources matter,” and “court documents, depositions, and regulatory
reports are often the most instrumental sources of accountability journalism.”55 Interviews with forty veteran reporters confirmed that legal
sources are “more important than just about any other source of information[ ]” for investigative journalism.56 So, lawsuits can generate a
feedback loop between the media, key regulatory agencies, and law
enforcement.57
Finally, releasing information may help provoke moral and cultural
shifts. It is hard to say why this happens in certain cases and not
others. And, of course, litigation is only one part of a larger cultural
apparatus, not the sole cause of these shifts, which are themselves difficult to document. Nevertheless, litigation seems to have contributed
to changing norms and the collective public mind on some important
topics.
Take the tobacco litigation, for instance.58 Smoking in the 1950s was
not only widespread—one out of every two Americans smoked—it
was glamorous: big screens filled with images of Ronald Reagan,
Humphrey Bogart, James Dean, Audrey Hepburn, and Lauren Bacall
coyly lighting up, posing, and exhaling.59 Fast forward to 1996. The
54. See generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 1074, 1074 (2005) (“We employ a simple two-period model showing that the strategy
of using confidential settlements by a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of
products sold than would be produced if a firm were committed to openness.”); Spector et al.,
supra note 51 (“Sometimes the only way [regulatory watchdogs] can learn about and act on a
possible threat to consumers is from evidence produced in lawsuits, but that evidence is often
hidden behind a wall of secrecy.”).
55. Roy Shapira, Law as Source: How the Legal System Facilitates Investigative Journalism, 37
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 156 (2018).
56. Id. at 183 (citing an interview with Walt Boganich of The New York Times).
57. See generally, TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE (2008) (describing
how suits against Catholic priests and the Church in conjunction with media scrutiny brought
accountability to an area previously dominated by secret settlements); Joanna C. Schwartz, What
Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012) (describing a feedback loop that
can occur between citizen lawsuits against police and police departments); Wendy Wagner, When
All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 700–01
(2007) (describing the ways in which individual litigants are less encumbered in seeking information from regulated entities than regulators are).
58. Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 928–30 (1998).
59. Movies include Rebel Without a Cause (James Dean), The Devil’s Pact (Humphrey Bogart), Breakfast at Tiffany’s (Audrey Hepburn). See Jason Rodrigues, When smoking was cool,
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New York Times profiled John Grisham’s best seller, Runaway Jury,
with the headline In a Legal Thriller, Big Tobacco on the Defensive.60
The tobacco industry became “Big Tobacco,” and was described as
malevolent and manipulative.61 What happened in between? Lots of
lawsuits and media coverage.62
In the first wave of tobacco suits, plaintiffs fared poorly. Tobacco
companies fought tooth and nail to avoid liability by contesting discovery requests, driving up plaintiffs’ costs, and blaming plaintiffs for
assuming the risks of smoking in the first place. They maintained a
near perfect litigation record.63 The tide began to change, however,
after Mr. Butts’ document dump, after plaintiffs’ lawyers teamed up
for an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to certify a class of ninety million plaintiffs based on a novel nicotine-as-addiction theory, and after
the Minnesota Attorney General successfully brought to light substantial incriminating evidence against the tobacco industry. 64
Slowly, public sentiment began to change. 65 And so did tobacco
companies’ litigation strategy. Discovery later unearthed legal advice
from Shook, Hardy & Bacon to the Tobacco Institute, the industry’s
public-relations arm, which said: “Shook, Hardy reminds us, I’m told,
that the entire matter of addiction is the most potent weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette case. We can’t defend continued smoking as ‘free choice’ if the person was
‘addicted.’”66 Professor Lynn Mather later commented, “[t]he problem was no longer a private problem of individual assumption of risk
cheap, legal and socially acceptable, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2009, 7:01 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/01/tobacco-industry-marketing. Vast cultural shifts
preceded the 1950s and are chronicled in ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE
RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 1–101
(2007).
60. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, In a Legal Thriller, Big Tobacco on the Defensive, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 1996), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/03/02/bsp/
jury.html; see also Mather, supra note 58, at 929 (“[I]n jury selection for one of the trials against
RJR, ‘prospective jurors were asked specifically whether they had read Runaway Jury,” John
Grisham’s best-seller about corrupt tobacco executives, and the jurors were closely questioned
about their understanding that the book was fiction.”).
61. Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 60.
62. Mather, supra note 58, at 935 (“The causal mechanisms included, for example, political
mobilization, negative media coverage, court-ordered release of information, and legal uncertainty leading to financial pressures from tobacco investors.”).
63. Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 23.
64. See supra notes 14–20, and accompanying text.
65. Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 632 (1999) (“In April 1997, a federal district court judge ruled that
the FDA may regulate cigarettes as a drug.”); Mather supra note 58, at 931.
66. Roberta B. Walburn, The Role of the Once-Confidential Industry Documents, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 431, 436 (1999).

R
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but was arguably a public problem of collective health and health care
costs.”67 Culturally, Mayo Clinic doctors reflected on the impact of
research made possible from the tobacco document repository, concluding that “[p]ublicity surrounding these publications has undoubtedly influenced public opinion about the unscrupulous behavior of the
tobacco industry and has furthered health policy goals, in part by denormalizing smoking as an acceptable behavior and discrediting the
tobacco industry as a stakeholder in health policy.”68
Although it is too early to see the opioid litigation’s entire moral
arc, one can already detect similar patterns of blame shifting. Just as
the tobacco industry amassed a steady win rate against individual litigants by raising an assumption-of-the-risk defense that blamed smokers for their own injuries,69 the opioids industry succeeded in many of
the individual opioid suits that preceded suits by cities, counties, and
states. Opioid manufacturers successfully defended themselves by
pointing the finger at doctor-shopping plaintiffs with histories of criminal conduct.70
Yet, like tobacco (based on some very preliminary evidence), it appears that the tide is shifting when it comes to opioids.71 And if it is,
lawsuits helped ignite the change. The Department of Justice successfully prosecuted John Kapoor, founder of opioid maker Insys Therapeutics, Inc., for playing a role in a racketeering conspiracy to illicitly
boost sales of Subsys, a fentanyl drug.72 Unsealed documents from
settled lawsuits against Purdue Pharma in Florida, West Virginia, and
Washington (obtained through Freedom of Information Act Requests) led to a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper concluding that “the introduction and marketing of OxyContin
explain a substantial share of overdose deaths over the last two decades.”73 And coverage in prominent papers like The New York
67. Mather, supra note 58, at 934.
68. Hurt et al., supra note 17, at 450.
69. WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION: THE STRATEGIC
CONTEXT 76 (2009).
70. Nicholas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S.C. L. REV. 637, 653 (2019) (citing
Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 481 (Miss. 2006); Inge v. McClelland, 257 F. Supp.
3d 1158, 1160–61 (D.N.M. 2017)).
71. For a look at this possible shift and its consequences in both tobacco and opioids, see
Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 23.
72. Joseph Walker & Jon Kamp, Founder of Opioid Maker Sentenced to 5 1/2 Years in Prison,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-opioid-executive-sentenced-to-5-years-in-prison-11579815251?st=Z815j3c8rsvuwjp&reflink=desktopwebshare_perma
link.
73. Abby E. Alpert et al., Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper 26500, 2019); Austin Frakt, Damage From OxyContin Continues to
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Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal has likewise
been enriched by defendants’ emails, depositions, and the other tidbits
that come out during discovery.74
As we describe in Part II below, hard data produced during discovery sheds light on faults that span the opioid supply chain, shifting
blame and undermining the individual-as-addict stigma.75 Here’s a
glimpse: the front page of The Washington Post reported, “[t]he
database reveals what each company knew about the number of pills
it was shipping and dispensing and precisely when they were aware of
those volumes, year by year, town by town.”76 The story highlighted
startling facts like this one: distributors and manufacturers shipped
306 prescription pills per person to small-town Norton, Virginia.77 The
front page of the New York Times ran the following headline: “3,271
Pill Bottles, a Town of 2,831: Court Filings Say Corporations Fed
Opioid Epidemic.”78 And another headline read, “D.E.A. Let Opioid
Production Surge as Crisis Grew, Justice Dept. Says[.]”79
As the media pointed out shortcomings among opioid defendants,
and city, county, and state lawsuits piled up, cultural institutions like
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, and the American Museum of Natural History announced that

Be Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/upshot/opioidsoxycontin-purdue-pharma.html?smid=url-share (last updated Apr. 16, 2020).
74. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, In Newly Released Deposition, OxyContin Owner Defends Response to Reports of Abuse, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
in-newly-released-deposition-oxycontin-owner-defends-response-to-reports-of-abuse11558818922 (“The March deposition offers a rare window into Dr. Sackler’s current views on
the opioid epidemic and the line he draws between what he calls real patients and addicts.”).
75. See generally Oliva, supra note 23, at 697. (“The West Virginia ARCOS opioid data that
Judge Stephens eventually unsealed in 2016 certainly supports the claim that the opioid defendants flooded small, rural Appalachian towns with prescription opioids while the DEA sat on its
hands.”); Terry, supra note 70, at 651–52 (discussing the ways in which the tort system adopts a
“blame frame” rather than one oriented toward system reform and noting that “[t]he opioid
litigation or—at least its rhetoric—is built on the same fundamental misunderstandings of the
opioid overdose epidemic as calls for additional criminalization”).
76. Scott Higham et al., 76 billion opioid pills: Newly released federal data unmasks the epidemic, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019, 7:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/76billion-opioid-pills-newly-released-federal-data-unmasks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62a73e-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html.
77. Id.
78. Jan Hoffman et al., 3,271 Pill Bottles, a Town of 2,831: Court Filings Say Corporations Fed
Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/health/
opioids-trial-addiction-drugstores.html.
79. Jacey Fortin, D.E.A. Let Opioid Production Surge as Crisis Grew, Justice Dept. Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/dea-opioid-crisis.html.
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they would no longer accept donations from the Sackler family.80
Books like Beth Macy’s Dopesick,81 Sam Quinones’s Dreamland,82
and Barry Meier’s Pain Killer83 topped bestseller lists. So, while cultural shifts are notoriously difficult to gauge, some early signs exist
that, if indeed changing public sentiments are underway, the discovery
of information in lawsuits played a role.
B. Benefits of Secrecy
Nevertheless, there can be important drawbacks to publicizing information about a defendant’s wrongdoing. After all, we tell each
other “secrets” because we don’t want everyone to know the truth
about something that happened. Secrecy can promote truthfulness,
whether between friends or in deposing high-powered corporate
figures like Richard Sackler.
That desire for truth telling animates liberal discovery rules that
protect information from broader disclosure under Rule 26(c) when
good cause requires it.84 Expansive discovery carries with it a dangerous ability to dig into the private lives of not only those involved in
the lawsuit, but also witnesses tangential to it. Without appropriate
limits, the discovery process can become a tool for abuse and embarrassment that runs headlong into personal privacy concerns and competitive business practices.85
Defendants argue that protective orders prevent single documents
from being taken out of context and allow corporate executives to
80. Jared S. Hopkins, The Met Stops Taking Gifts From Purdue Pharma’s Sacklers, WALL ST.
J. (May 15, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-met-stops-taking-gifts-from-purduepharmas-sacklers-11557946840.
81. See generally BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY
THAT ADDICTED AMERICA (2018).
82. See generally SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC (2015).
83. See generally BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: AN EMPIRE OF DECEIT AND THE ORIGIN OF
AMERICA’S OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2018).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
85. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1984) (“It is clear from experience
that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse.
This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate
privacy interests of litigants and third parties.”); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1983) [hereinafter Marcus, Myth and Reality];
Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (At Last) that the Federal Rules do not
Declare that Discovery is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2006). But
see Matthew A. Shapiro, The Indignities of Civil Litigation, 100 B.U. L. REV. 501, 510
(2020)(“By choosing to humiliate themselves—by revealing personal information that emphasizes their lower social status and thus undermines their preferred self-presentation—weaker
plaintiffs can shame their more powerful adversaries, countering a defendant’s social superiority
with a form of moral superiority.”)
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write things down without fear of retribution.86 Moreover, the breadth
of discovery is out of step with more restrictive evidentiary admissibility requirements; releasing otherwise inadmissible information to the
public could influence the jury pool.87 Plus, court time is a scarce resource. Requiring judges to review individual discovery documents exchanged between the parties to decipher which ones might be entitled
to confidentiality is not a burden that courts can bear in a lawsuit’s
early stages.88 Blanket protective orders thus became the norm in the
early 2000s.89 Commentators argued that standardization allowed parties to avoid the expense and delay of debating a protective order’s
scope.90
Without settlements that keep company documents private, corporate defendants have a greater incentive to engage in the kind of
scorched-earth litigation that characterized the early tobacco suits.
Plaintiffs suing over prescriptions or medical devices who simultaneously face hefty medical bills may be forced into bankruptcy before
ever seeing a penny in settlement money. But, by avoiding expensive
court battles over protective orders, confidentiality may promote
faster and more lucrative deals. One might, for instance, view the $5
million settlement offer by GM to the Meltons as including a secrecy
premium.91 And plaintiffs’ attorneys’ primary ethical duties are to
their clients, not the public.
Secrecy can also be in a plaintiff’s lawyer’s personal interest.
Scorched-earth litigation increases investments needed and extends
the time before the attorney will get paid.92 Once negative information about a product surfaces, the plaintiff’s attorney can no longer
capitalize on her specialized knowledge; it joins the commons and is
free for the taking. This was a lesson that the Meltons’ attorney, Lance
86. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 68 (1995).
87. Of course, once a case settles, there is less concern about information’s potential to taint a
jury pool.
88. Shira A. Scheindlin, Discovering the Discoverable: A Bird’s Eye View of Discovery in a
Complex Multidistrict Class Action Litigation, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 401 (1986).
89. This observation is based on the authors’ familiarity with cases over the relevant period.
For a study that captures a snapshot in time, see Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1249, 1277 (2020) (documenting ubiquity of umbrella
orders which allow parties to designate any material as confidential).
90. Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 85, at 9.
91. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 114 (discussing what might be gained were a plaintiff’s
attorney to decide not to go to the FDA over troubling information revealed in discovery and
suggesting that “it is inappropriate to leave that decision to a plaintiff and her lawyer”).
92. See generally Jaimi Dowdell & Benjamin Lesser, These lawyers battle corporate America –
and keep its secrets, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-lawyers/.
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Cooper, learned when he was boxed out of key roles in the subsequent MDL that his discovery helped engender.93 Thus, without the
possibility of secrecy, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be less—not more—
inclined to accept and invest in lawsuits against major corporations.
***
As this debate suggests, secrecy can pit critical litigation values
against one another and raise age-old questions over what courts are
for.94 How should the system weigh victim empowerment, litigant autonomy, and an attorney’s ethical duty to reach the best outcome for
her client versus broader concerns about public health and safety?
Should the MDL context shift this balance? In MDLs, judges have
already prioritized settlement and efficiency over litigant autonomy.
Secrecy is part of that calculus, one that affects not only the parties
and the court, but also the public at large.
Scholars adjust the scales differently depending upon whether they
view courts as principally a situs for resolving disputes or an outwardlooking enterprise that must do more than simply adjudicate parties’
rights.95 Yet, courts remain focused on the case before them, for this is
what they are structured to do. Many judges are understandably
driven by pro-settlement norms and motivated to resolve litigation
quickly.96
93. ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULLITIGATION 72–75 (2019).
94. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 289 (1999); Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting
Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1143, 1146–48 (2009); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984);
Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1280 (2009); Christopher R.
Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1465 (2006).
95. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2680 (1995) (noting that
“the dispute and its resolution remain the property of the parties and can be removed from the
system in any way, as long as the parties consent”); Luban, supra note 24, at 2638 (“[T]here is
nothing wrong with using [the parties’] resort to the courts as an occasion for improving the
law.”); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1379 (1994) (“But courts (and other dispute resolvers) do
more than resolve disputes; they broadcast messages to various audiences about the conduct of
disputes and about the norms of conduct underlying those disputes.”); Morrison, supra note 6, at
118 (“Litigation is not just for the litigants, at least not in our system. In our system, we are
concerned with overall justice . . . We are concerned about public controversies that arise in
public forums and are decided there.”).
96. Federal judges are subject to a “six month list” publicly cataloguing motions pending for
more than six months and cases pending for more than three years. This mild shaming mechanism has been documented to affect the timing of judicial decisions. See generally Miguel F.P. de
TIDISTRICT
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The tension between public and private litigation goals came to a
head early in the twenty-first century as several isolated movements
seemed to combine: from 1993–2005, Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl
annually proposed legislation to curb secret settlements;97 in 2001, the
chief judge of the District of South Carolina amended the court’s local
rules to prohibit parties from filing secret settlements with the court;98
in 2002, Sen. Kohl asked the Judicial Conference to consider amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prohibit secret settlements,99 and in 2003, “60 Minutes” aired a program on secret
settlements entitled Hush Money.100 States passed laws limiting secret
settlements that hid dangers from the general public.101 Federal legislation was introduced to require release of some information, but was
never passed.102
One of the problems with such sunshine-in-litigation laws is the difficulty of defining what information is in “the public interest.” On its
own, the term does little analytical work. As one might expect, researchers tend to disagree, and some definitions are so expansive that
virtually any case might have public repercussions.103 For example,
one could argue that sexual abuse and legal and medical-malpractice
cases touch on public concerns, although they involve private actors.104 Given our focus on MDL, we include environmental cases,
products-liability cases, transportation, and other single-event mass disasters that would warrant federal coordination. These cases touch on
the public interest because they have the potential to affect thousands
of possible litigants outside of the litigation immediately before the
court. We recognize, however, that there is almost no limit to which
lawsuits reveal information in the public interest; indeed, the definiFigueiredo et al., The Six-Month List and the Unintended Consequences of Judicial Accountability, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (2020).
97. Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 439, 441 (2006) (citing proposed legislation).
98. D.S.C. Local Civ. R. 5.03(E).
99. Reagan, supra note 97, at 442.
100. 60 Minutes II: Hush Money (CBS television broadcast Jan. 15, 2003).
101. See FLA. STAT. § 69.081(3) (2020); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(C) (1995); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 41.1 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.611(2) (1994); TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
102. Secrecy That Kills, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/opinion/sunday/secrecy-that-kills.html (describing a proposed federal law limiting secret settlements
in light of the General Motors Cobalt car ignition switch cases); Doré, supra note 94, at 311–13.
103. E.g., Reagan, supra note 97, at 454–55.
104. Robert Timothy Reagan et al., Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court,
FED. JUD. CTR. 1, 8 (2004) (listing types of cases that might be of special public interest as
including environmental, product liability, professional malpractice, public party defendant, very
serious injury (death or serious permanent disability), and sexual abuse).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL208.txt

364

unknown

Seq: 20

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:48

[Vol. 70:345

tion could conceivably be used even in ordinary car accident suits or
contract actions.
II. SECRECY: DOCTRINE

VS.

PRACTICE

In the Opiate proceeding, after cities and counties filed thousands of
suits against drug manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies in federal court, transferee Judge Dan Polster sealed a significant number of
documents, including the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) ARCOS database.105 ARCOS monitors controlled substances, mapping a
drug’s whereabouts from point-of-origin to point-of-sale (or distribution via a hospital), showing each stop along the way.106 The database
allows users to pinpoint who knew what and when, and is a valuable
tool for cities and counties seeking to prove a causal link between a
defendant’s conduct and the influx of opiates into a particular geographic location.
Upon plaintiffs’ discovery request, Judge Polster ordered the DEA
to turn over its ARCOS data to them but denied the Washington Post
and Charleston Gazette Mail’s public records request for access.107 Defendants argued that the data contained confidential business information and was crucial to ongoing law enforcement efforts, and
should thus be shielded from disclosure to third parties by a protective
order, which the plaintiffs agreed to.108 In addition, Judge Polster allowed parties to submit sealed and redacted pleadings, briefs, and
other court-filed documents, many of which he would have to rely
upon to decide the proceeding’s merits.109 But when the public is not
privy to the basis of judicial decision making, questions can arise
about improper influence, fairness, incompetence, perjury, and
fraud.110 The story doesn’t end there, but it could have—many do.
The Washington Post and Charleston Gazette Mail intervened and ap105. Opinion and Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio July 26, 2018). ARCOS stands for Automaton of Reports and Consolidated Orders
System.
106. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 923–24 (6th Cir. 2019). For a richly
detailed account of these events, see Oliva, supra note 23, at 665–83.
107. Opinion and Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio July 26, 2018).
108. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 924.
109. See, e.g., Sealed Document, Fourth Amended Complaint, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2018); Sealed Document, The State of Alabama’s Combined Response to McKesson’s & The Manufacturers’ Motions to Dismiss, In re
Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2018).
110. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672 (3d Cir.
2019) (“Public observation facilitated by the right of access ‘diminishes possibilities for injustice,
incompetence, perjury, and fraud.’ ”).
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pealed to the Sixth Circuit to gain access to both the ARCOS data and
the sealed and redacted documents.
In general, secrecy in MDLs might be relevant to one of four categories of information: (1) documents unearthed during discovery that
concerns the alleged underlying wrongdoing, (2) settlement negotiations between lawyers, (3) settlement amounts, or (4) attorneys’ fees
(including judicially ordered common-benefit fees and individually retained attorneys’ fees).111 We focus our efforts here solely on the first
category: documents concerning the underlying wrongdoing.
This Part explains the litigation over the ARCOS data, examining it
from two angles. Part A explores the law that governs public access to
information about the defendant’s wrongdoing as it stands today. Precedent has developed from the idea that the public has a right to see
our judicial system at work in the trial setting. But, of course, civil
trials now occur in less than three percent of all cases.112 A dividing
line persists, however, between private, party-held discovery on one
hand (the ARCOS data), and the documents that courts rely upon to
decide a case’s merits on the other (sealed and redacted pleadings,
briefs, and other court-filed documents and exhibits). Various tests reflect this split: Rule 26’s relatively weak “good-cause” standard governs protective orders, whereas the common law and First
Amendment’s presumption in favor of public access governs certain
judicial documents. Part B explains why, if the law is relatively clear,
key players may nevertheless ignore it, to their benefit and society’s
detriment.
A. The Rules of Disclosure
Once the Opiate plaintiffs gained access to the ARCOS data, they
agreed to a protective order under Rule 26(c) that prohibited them
from disclosing that data to the media.113 Rule 26 requires parties
wishing to keep information confidential to show “good cause.”114 It’s
designed to protect parties or people from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” and gives judges ample leeway to safeguard private parties’ interests so long as the moving
111. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 86, at 67 (describing all but the category of common-benefit
fees).
112. See Table C-4, U.S. District Courts–Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2020, U.S. COURTS, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2020.pdf.
113. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 930.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1); see also Endo, supra note 89, at 1277 (finding that judges apply
this standard generously to those seeking confidentiality).
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party demonstrates particular facts that warrant protection.115 As the
Opiate proceeding illustrates, however, parties often stipulate to blanket protective orders without showing particular facts, and these stipulations rarely face judicial challenge.116
The Washington Post and Charleston Gazette Mail’s requests show
how public needs can diverge significantly from parties’ interests.117
The press wanted the ARCOS data to tell a “more complete and accurate story” of a national crisis, and argued that the harm from disclosure to the DEA and defendants was speculative at best.118 The
reason that they had to move for disclosure was that some courts reason that public access rights do not apply until parties file merits-related motions and attach the relevant documents or data, turning
select party-held discovery into “judicial records.”119 The idea is that
only proceedings that are similar to trial trigger publicity. This seems
to be the thinking behind Judge Polster’s approach in declining the
press’s request: he applied Rule 26(c)’s good-cause standard and relied on the Supreme Court’s 1984 opinion, Seattle Times Co. v. Rinehart, which explained that discovery materials “are not public
components of a civil trial.”120
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. But this result was neither
predictable nor inevitable, for circuit courts tend to give district judges
wide latitude under Rule 26(c). The Sixth Circuit noted some of the
key factors influencing its decision to reverse: the media acted “as representatives of the public,” a Pulitzer-prize winning exposé had already been penned based on access to a small amount of ARCOS
data in a West Virginia lawsuit, and the media’s work prompted a
House of Representatives committee to investigate and report on the
opioid epidemic.121 Somewhat ironically, however, these revelations
were possible because prior lawsuits generated—and made public—
115. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 929.
116. Id. Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 86, at 68 (“Courts have broad discretion in entering protective orders and
sealing records. Most agreements are uncontested, and crowded calendars put great pressure on
judges to move cases. As a result, judges routinely approve sealing and secrecy orders.”); Doré,
supra note 94, at 337–43 (discussing some of the benefits and drawbacks of blanket protective
orders).
117. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 930 (“It is a grave mischaracterization to state that Plaintiffs ‘energetically fought’ over the issue of public disclosure
when they neither raised it before the district court nor even objected when the district court
stated that the issue was not disputed.”).
118. Id. at 927.
119. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006).
120. Opinion and Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio July 26, 2018).
121. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 933–34.
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key information. The social impact, combined with the Washington
Post and Charleston Gazette Mail’s ability to make a case for granular
city-and-county-level detail, prompted the Sixth Circuit to rule that
the press “presented substantial evidence of the significant public
interest[.]”122
The Sixth Circuit might easily have stopped there. But citing its
ability to take issue with sealed and redacted documents on its own
initiative, it went further, addressing the briefs, pleadings, and other
court-filed documents. Explaining that these documents “are the sort
of records that would help the public ‘assess for itself the merits of
judicial decisions,’” it applied a “strong presumption in favor of openness,” noting that the presumption “applies here with extra strength
given the paramount importance of the litigation’s subject matter.”123
Because courts must justify sealing decisions with specific findings and
conclusions that give reasons for the nondisclosure even absent a
party’s objection, which Judge Polster failed to do, the Sixth Circuit
vacated and remanded. In so doing, it cautioned that sealing warranted “a compelling reason” that was “narrowly tailored to serve that
reason.”124
The reasoning in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates the general distinctions that have emerged when it comes to the public’s right
of access to information about a defendant’s wrongdoing. Figure 1 below illustrates the trajectory that many courts use, often presuming
secrecy at the party-led discovery level and moving toward transparency when merits-based adjudication occurs.

122. Id. at 934.
123. Id. at 939.
124. Id.
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FIGURE 1. LEGAL STANDARDS ON THE TRANSPARENCY OF
DEFENDANT’S UNDERLYING WRONGDOING BY STAGE

Transparency

Secrecy

Party-held
discovery:
Rule 26
“good cause”

Documents
filed in
support of
non-merits
related
motions: 1st
Amendment
& common
law

Documents filed in
support of merits-related
adjudication: 1st
Amendment & common
law (public interest
becomes more
compelling)

1. Discovery: Rule 26(c)
During party-led discovery, courts enter protective orders upon a
showing of good cause under Rule 26(c).125 As Judge Polster noted,
the Supreme Court observed in 1984, “pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial” and “were not
open to the public at common law[.]”126 Lower courts fell in line accordingly. The Second Circuit explained that documents that never
appear on the docket but are “simply ‘passed between the parties in
discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.’”127 And the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery stage,
before the material enters the judicial record.”128 Yet, rigid adherence
to these standards would have dictated a far different outcome on the
ARCOS data than the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, for those standards cordon off all party-held discovery documents from public access.
125. Different courts use different tests for deciding whether good cause exists. See, e.g., In re
Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 671–72 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering privacy interests, embarrassment, whether the information is being sought for an improper
purpose, whether the information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing information will promote fairness and efficiency, whether the party benefiting from confidentiality is
a public entity or official, and whether the case involves important public issues).
126. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
127. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71
F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995)).
128. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20).
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Despite our flattening them for explanatory purposes, it is important to remember that these categories are neither neat nor defined in
absolute terms. Contradicting the Seventh and Second Circuits, for
example, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that it “is well-established
that the fruits of pre-trial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.”129 It reasons that Rule
26(c) merely authorizes courts to override that presumption where a
party shows good cause. Other circuits, like the Third Circuit, apply a
factor test, considering whether a party has shown good cause, the
public’s need for pressing health-and-safety information, whether the
beneficiary of confidentiality is a public entity or official, and whether
the case involves issues of interest to the public.130
Party-held discovery is typically where the most revealing secrets
remain. Absent a whistleblower or specialized knowledge that gives a
plaintiff insight into a defendant’s practices before suing, information
revealing wrongdoing is typically unearthed during discovery. If no
settlement occurs first, that information may then appear as exhibits
to substantive motions, but there are no guarantees.
Parties cross the line from merely having to show “good cause”
under Rule 26(c) to having to demonstrate “compelling reasons”
when they place discovery material into the court’s record.131 Because
so few cases go to trial, courts have recognized summary judgment as
a substitute; they thus apply the same logic that opens courthouse
doors to the public during trial to these dispositive motions.132 As the
Sixth Circuit reasoned in the tobacco cases, when material enters the
court’s record, the public has a “strong interest in obtaining the information[.]”133 That right to know need not be limited to the case’s outcome; it can include “the conduct giving rise to the case.”134 As this
suggests, relevant information can appear elsewhere in court dockets
too, such as in requests for protective orders and in discovery dis129. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court Nev., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.
1999)).
130. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d at 671.
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(1)(A) (“But disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the
following discovery requests and responses must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents or tangible
things or to permit entry onto land, and requests for admission.”). Note that Rule 5(d) used to
require all discovery documents to be filed with the district court unless the court specified otherwise before it was amended to forbid such filings.
132. E.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014).
133. Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016).
134. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL208.txt

370

unknown

Seq: 26

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:48

[Vol. 70:345

putes,135 but the public’s right of access tends to wane here, depending
on the circuit.
2. Judicial Records: Common Law and First Amendment
Even though courts apply some combination of First Amendment
and common-law rights to judicial documents and records (and thus
parties must meet a higher standard for secrecy), clear categorization
is further muddied by the myriad of ways in which courts define the
term “judicial records.” In general, judicial records are documents
filed with the court that play a role in the adjudicative process or aid
in deciding substantive rights.136
But not all courts put all motions that might contain evidence of
wrongdoing on equal footing. Several circuits have adopted a variant
of the view that only documents submitted to aid the court in determining the parties’ substantive rights are entitled to the open courts
presumption.137 The Second Circuit, for instance, has held that merely
135. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that the courts of
this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.”) Courts have held that the presumption of public access
extends to docket sheets themselves, labeling them a “critical component to providing meaningful access to civil proceedings.” Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 268; see also United States v. Valenti,
987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (observing that dockets are generally public documents).
136. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining judicial
records as “materials ‘which properly come before the court in the course of an adjudicatory
proceeding and which are relevant to that adjudication’ ”) (quoting FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt.
Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412–13 (1st Cir. 1987)); In re United States, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013)
(defining documents filed with the court as judicial records “if they play a role in the adjudicative process, or adjudicate substantive rights”); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d
110, 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (defining judicial documents as documents that are “relevant to the
performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process[,]” but noting that once
those documents “come to the attention of the district judge, they can fairly be assumed to play a
role in the court’s deliberations”); In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying a right of access to bids to become class counsel that the court heard in camera).
137. Other circuits not mentioned below have left the question unanswered, setting the
threshold in individual cases at items filed with the court or transcripts of court hearings. See,
e.g., Bradley v. Ackal, 954 F.3d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 2020) (including settlement agreements submitted to the district court for approval as judicial records as well as sealed minutes and noting
“[w]hile this court has not generally defined ‘judicial record’ or yet interpreted minutes as a
judicial record, it would defy commonsense if the minutes in this case did not qualify as a judicial
record”); IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The companies, however,
acquiesce in what appears to be a modern trend in federal cases to treat pleadings in civil litigation (other than discovery motions and accompanying exhibits) as presumptively public, even
when the case is pending before judgment[ ] or resolved by settlement.”) (internal citations omitted); Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1073 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile the public has a presumptive
right to access discovery materials that are filed with the court, used in a judicial proceeding, or
otherwise constitute ‘judicial records,’ the same is not true of materials produced during discovery but not filed with the court.”). The Tenth Circuit has noted the common-law right of access
to judicial records but appears not to have further defined the term. E.g., Colony Ins. Co. v.
Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2012).
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filing a document with the court does not automatically make it a judicial record; rather, “the item filed must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process” to
qualify.138 The right to access court documents, it reasons, derives
from the need to publicly monitor the court and if the court is not
determining parties’ substantive rights—the core of an Article III
judge’s duties—then documents supporting those decisions play a
lesser role.139 It further clarifies that courts perform judicial functions
when they rule on motions before them and exercise their supervisory
powers, meaning that documents must “reasonably have the tendency
to influence a district court’s ruling,” but that judges need not actually
rely upon them.140 It thus envisions a continuum that ranges from
“matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come
within a court’s purview solely to insure [sic.] their irrelevance.”141
Materials passed solely between the parties during discovery play only
a “negligible role” in performing Article III duties and therefore lie
beyond public reach.142 The First and Fourth Circuits similarly define
judicial records as those that “play a role in the adjudicative process,
or adjudicate substantive rights.”143
Some circuits that define “judicial records” more narrowly reason
that public policies differ, that when courts grant protective orders
under Rule 26(c), they have already determined that “good cause”
exists to protect against disclosure, and that secrecy should be preserved for things like sealed discovery materials attached to discovery
disputes.144 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits likewise distinguish between motions that go to the heart of the dispute, like summary judgment, motions to dismiss, and motions for judgment on the pleadings,
as compared with tangential motions such as discovery disputes, with
a presumption of access attaching to the former but not the latter.145
138. United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. Id. at 1050.
140. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2019).
141. Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049.
142. Id. at 1049–50.
143. In re United States, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Kravetz,
706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (defining “judicial records” as “materials on which a court relies in
determining the litigants’ substantive rights” but not materials “that ‘relate[ ] merely to the
judge’s role in management of the trial’ and therefore ‘play no role in the adjudication process’ ”) (quoting In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Boston
Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 189 (1st Cir. 2003)).
144. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006).
145. FTC v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 63 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[M]aterial filed with discovery motions is not subject to the common-law right of access, whereas discovery material
filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial resolution of the merits is subject to
the common-law right.”); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178; Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen.
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Thus, in courts such as the Ninth Circuit, non-dispositive documents
must meet only Rule 26’s good-cause standard.146
By contrast, the Third Circuit affords a presumptive right of access
to all pretrial motions “of a nondiscovery nature,” regardless of
whether they are preliminary or dispositive.147 The Third Circuit also
distinguishes between types of suits in applying this standard. In class
actions, for instance, where some members of the public will be directly affected as class members, it held that the standards for denying
public access “should be applied . . . with particular strictness.”148
Consequently, it defines judicial records as documents that have
“been filed with the court . . . or otherwise somehow incorporated or
integrated into a district court’s adjudicatory proceeding[.]”149
Across all circuits, once the public’s default right to access judicial
records applies, a party seeking to keep information sealed must meet
more than just Rule 26’s “good-cause” standard. At this point, public
access isn’t just about the underlying information, but the way that
courts use that information to resolve disputes. As the Third Circuit
explained, “[t]he right of access ‘promotes public confidence in the
judicial system by enhancing testimonial trustworthiness and the quality of justice dispensed by the court.’”150 Both the First Amendment
and the common law provide the public with well-established rights to
access court records, and while both presume access, as a constitutional protection, First Amendment protections tend to be stronger
(but narrower in application) than the common-law right to judicial
records.151
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between dispositive and
nondispositive motions); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2016) (moving away from the distinction between dispositive and nondispositive motions
and toward a test that asks whether the motion is related to the underlying cause of action). But
see In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2001) (“ ‘[T]here is a presumptive right of
public access to pretrial motions of a nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary or dispositive,
and the material filed in connection therewith.’ ”) (quoting Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion
Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993)).
146. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097.
147. Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 164.
148. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194.
149. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672 (3d Cir.
2019) (citing In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192).
150. Id. (citing Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988)).
151. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 939 (6th Cir. 2019) (“This
strong presumption in favor of openness [of court records] is only overcome if a party can show a
compelling reason why certain documents or portions thereof should be sealed, and the seal itself is narrowly tailored to serve that reason. Further, the greater the public interest in the litigation’s subject matter, the greater the showing necessary to overcome the presumption of
access.”) (quoting Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th
Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); Bernstein v. Bernstein
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Although courts have long recognized a public right to access judicial proceedings (including in camera proceedings)152 and inspect and
copy public records (including judicial records),153 the common-law
right is not absolute. Courts balance the need for accountability
against other competing values such as the potential for humiliation
and embarrassment or the need to keep confidential business information private.154 If the party wanting to restrict access demonstrates
that those competing values outweigh the public’s right of access, then
the court may seal the document so long as it articulates both the compelling reason and the factual basis for its ruling.155 As one might expect with any common-law right, different circuits employ slightly
divergent standards when weighing competing values.156
The First Amendment provides greater protections than the common law, but not all circuits have applied it to documents exchanged

Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2016) (“To overcome the First
Amendment right of access, the proponent of sealing must demonstrate that closure is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Broad and general findings and conclusory assertions are insufficient to justify deprivation of public access to the record; specific, on-the-record findings are required.”) (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110,
116 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 243 (2d Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–97 (explaining that before sealing a court record, the court must provide “a compelling reason” for
secrecy “and articulate[ ] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of
Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)).
152. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192.
153. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
154. Id. at 598 (“For example, the common-law right of inspection has bowed before the
power of a court to insure that its records are not ‘used to gratify private spite or promote public
scandal’ through the publication of ‘the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce
case.’ ”) (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 836 (1893)); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 (2d
Cir. 2019); Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1986); In re
Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
155. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097.
156. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672–73
(holding that, to overcome a strong presumption of access, the district court “must articulate ‘the
compelling, countervailing interests to be protected,’ make ‘specific findings on the record concerning the effects of disclosure,’ and ‘provide[ ] an opportunity for interested third parties to be
heard.’ ”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194); FTC v.
AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 62 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Our case law lists several relevant factors
to consider, including ‘whether the records are sought for such illegitimate purposes as to promote public scandal or gain unfair commercial advantage, [and] whether access is likely to promote public understanding of historically significant events.’ ”); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n,
565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring the party wishing to seal judicial records to show
that compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings outweigh the presumption of access and that courts must balance the competing interests of the public and the party who wishes
to keep judicial records secret).
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in civil cases.157 The Supreme Court has extended those protections
only to criminal pretrial proceedings and trials, noting that the First
Amendment covers instances where “the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public[,]” and where
“public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.”158 When both prongs apply, First
Amendment rights attach and courts may close off access only if doing
so is “necessitated by a compelling government interest” and is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”159 Lower courts extend these
protections to criminal trials including the voir dire of potential jurors
and preliminary hearings, and some include summary judgment motions in civil cases, reasoning that they serve as a substitute to trial.160
First Amendment guarantees require parties seeking to keep information secret to identify an overriding interest demonstrating that
sealing “is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.”161 Higher values include a defendant’s right to
a fair trial before an impartial jury, victims’ or witnesses’ privacy
rights, grand jury transcripts, warrant materials, trade secrets, and national security risks, not just concerns about tarnishing a corporate
image or embarrassing a party.162 Outside of well-established protec157. For courts applying the First Amendment to the civil context, see, e.g., Courthouse News
Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. NYCTA, 684 F.3d
286, 298 (2d Cir. 2012); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th
Cir. 1994); Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988). Neither the
Third nor the Eighth Circuits have decided whether the First Amendment covers civil documents such as those attached to summary judgment motions. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d at 680 (“Although the constitutional issue is an interesting
one, we again decline to define the parameters of the First Amendment right in a case where the
common law right affords sufficient protection.”); Flynt v. Lombardi, 885 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir.
2018). The Eleventh Circuit applies the First Amendment to a limited extent. Chi. Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]his court has extended the
scope of the constitutional right of access to include civil actions pertaining to the release or
incarceration of prisoners and their confinement. Materials merely gathered as a result of the
civil discovery process, however, do not fall within the scope of the constitutional right of access’s compelling interest standard.”). For a list of courts concluding that the First Amendment
covers civil trials, see Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013).
158. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
159. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Wash. Post Co., 807
F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986)); Flynt, 885 F.3d at 512 (noting that the Eighth Circuit hasn’t yet
extended the First Amendment to civil proceedings, but to the extent that such a right exists, it
would depend on two prerequisites: “(1) a historical tradition of accessibility, and (2) a significant positive role for public access in the functioning of the judicial process in question”) (quoting IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 2013)).
160. E.g., Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 256, 267.
161. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 9.
162. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 268–71; Foltz v. St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122,
1135 (9th Cir. 2003); Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
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tions for these categories, the party wishing to keep the information
secret must overcome a strong presumption in favor of access with
compelling reasons under the common-law standard.163
3. Settlements
The same information that might be made public at trial or when
attached to a dispositive motion may remain secret if a proceeding
settles before a party asks the court to adjudicate the merits. When it
comes to secrecy and settlements, much depends on the settlement’s
status: settlements might be purely private between the parties, filed
with the court as consent decrees, approved by the court as a class
settlement, distributed by a court-appointed special master (as are
some inventory settlements in MDLs), or informally approved by the
court (as are some global settlement agreements).164 One recent study
that tracked all of the products-liability and sales-practice proceedings
pending on the MDL docket in May 2013 showed that 45.6% ended in
aggregate settlements and 27.3% concluded through class-action settlements as of May 2018.165
Courts have discretion to lift protective orders after settlement has
been reached. Consider, for instance, the Vietnam Veterans of
America’s post-class-action settlement motion to unseal discovery
materials in the Agent Orange litigation. Despite defendants’ contention that disclosing discovery materials impermissibly altered the
terms of the class settlement (which required discovery documents to
be returned to them), the Second Circuit upheld Judge Jack B. Weinstein’s decision to lift his protective order, noting that “a district court
retains the power to modify or lift protective orders that it has
entered.”166
Very often, however, courts do not have the ability to exercise this
discretion. Many settlements lie outside judicial reach and regulating
settlement disclosures may drive information further underground
through forum shopping or by settling claims before filing a complaint.167 Empirical data on the rates at which parties agree to secret
settlements and file them with the court as opposed to simply settling
163. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.
164. BURCH, supra note 93, at 101–10.
165. Of the remaining proceedings, 6.8% were still ongoing, 16.4% resulted in defense verdicts, and 1.3% ended in individual settlements. Id. at 224.
166. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987), superseded in part
by statute on other grounds, SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n.11 (2d Cir. 2001).
167. Drahozal & Hines, supra note 94, at 1480–83 (discussing ways in which parties might
shop for a different forum or settle before filing suit to avoid any state- or forum-specific disclosure requirements).
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out of court without judicial involvement is hard to come by. In 2004,
the Federal Judicial Center conducted a comprehensive study of
sealed settlements filed with courts, but noted that “[u]sually such
agreements are not filed.”168 It found that 20% of the product-liability
cases (broadly, not MDLs specifically) included sealed settlement
agreements.169
B. Why Disclosure Rules Fail
The ARCOS data that the Sixth Circuit ordered revealed in the
Opiate proceeding became the basis for a widely read Washington
Post exposé.170 Although the right result came about eventually—with
the Sixth Circuit ordering Judge Polster to re-evaluate every document placed under seal or redacted—in many complex cases, no one
reviews or disputes “blanket” protection orders. That gives the parties
significant control over what court filings become public. Frequently,
there will be no appeal because no news outlet or public-interest organization pursues the issue. As one prominent jurist observed, when
such blanket orders allow “parties to seal whatever they want . . . the
interest in publicity will go unprotected unless the media are
interested.”171
A recent Reuters investigation found that large numbers of documents are routinely filed under seal in large-scale lawsuits.172 Because
secrecy promotes settlement, we suspect that in many of these cases
the good-cause standard for deciding whether documents ought to receive protective status under Rule 26(c) and the compelling-interest
standard for filing judicial records under seal are not being rigorously
applied. In MDL, settlement benefits all of the controlling stakeholders—lead plaintiffs’ lawyers, defendants, and transferee judges
alike.173 So does secrecy.
168. Reagan et al., supra note 104, at 1.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Drilling into the DEA’s pain pill database, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/dea-pain-pill-database/.
171. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir.
1999).
172. Benjamin Lesser et al., How judges added to the grim toll of opioids, REUTERS (June 25,
2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-judges/
(using Westlaw searches, a database that includes only a small fraction of court docket filings,
Reuters found that over the past 20 years, judges sealed evidence relevant to public health and
safety in about half of the 115 biggest defective-product cases consolidated before federal judges
in so-called multidistrict litigation).
173. For more on this, see BURCH, supra note 93, at 24–34. See also Drahozal & Hines, supra
note 94, at 1458–59.
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Large-scale settlements benefit both parties. Defendants can resolve as many claims as possible in one stroke, take their hit, and return to business, all of which shareholders tend to view as a net
positive. On the plaintiffs’ side, settlement promotes plaintiffs’ lawyers’ interests by allowing them to recoup what may have been a
years-long substantial cash investment into a particular proceeding.
And some plaintiffs’ lawyers use settlement as an opportunity to contractually increase their common-benefit fees by inserting fee provisions into aggregate settlements.174 Settlement may also allow
plaintiffs’ attorneys to bypass doctrinal uncertainties and problems of
proof (especially proof of individual causation) by packaging plaintiffs
together in a global settlement.
Transferee judges, too, are incentivized to promote settlement.
Many deem settlement a hallmark of their success and stigmatize remand as failure.175 MDLs are plum judicial assignments; only around
27% of active judges and 20% of senior judges receive them.176 Of
those chosen few, 80% wanted another assignment,177 and the judges
who are left out often “campaign” to receive one.178 When the Federal
Judicial Center asked judges who had never presided over an MDL
whether they’d be interested in doing so, 70% said yes.179 But once
they receive an MDL, if they fail to resolve it quickly, they are unlikely to be assigned another. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has exhibited a historic commitment to awarding new
proceedings to active case managers with a proven ability to settle
them.180 These incentives are consistent with the broader judicial culture in which settlement equals success. Yet, the “settlement culture,”
as Judge William Young dubbed it, “is nowhere more prevalent than
in MDL practice.”181
174. BURCH, supra note 93 at 57 (“When [lawyers] negotiate aspects of their fees with the
defendant, they raise concerns over self-dealing. Yet, as Table A.4 shows, lead plaintiffs’ lawyers
in 90% of the proceedings with publicly available settlements in the dataset did just that.”).
175. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144 (2013) (“As a matter of
judicial culture, remanding cases is viewed as an acknowledgement that the MDL judge has
failed to resolve the case[.]”).
176. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1407 FISCAL
YEAR 2016, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. 10–11 (2016).
177. Id.
178. John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 26, 30 (2012).
179. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, supra note 176.
180. Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 831, 907 (2017).
181. DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D. Mass. 2006).
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Promoting settlement is an important goal for the courts, but it is
not the only goal and it entails costs that are seldom discussed in judicial opinions. Settlement is not more important than the safety of our
citizens or the ability of legislatures to access information that will
allow them to adequately oversee the work of the courts and administrative agencies, and most importantly, to pass laws protecting the citizenry. Opportunities to educate the public, hold wrongdoers
accountable, and potentially save lives are lost when information is
hidden. Institutionally, the courts’ relatively cavalier attitude towards
these benefits is evident at the highest level when the Supreme Court
fails to issue substantial sanctions for discovery abuses involving product defects that pose danger to human life.182
The procedural form of aggregation also affects transparency. Federal courts certify very few mass torts as class actions. Unlike MDL or
informal aggregations, class-action settlements must undergo a public
fairness hearing that allows objectors to participate and reinsert an
element of adversarial challenge to what might otherwise be a cozy
gathering of former adversaries who are now all friends of the deal.183
When mass torts conclude in private aggregate settlements, the settlements are often subject neither to public scrutiny nor to appellate
review.
There are moments in an MDL when transparency is possible, however. If bellwether trials or state-court trials occur before settlement,
then information about underlying wrongdoing may be aired. 184 But
bellwether trials are not routine. One study showed that only 44% of
transferee judges conducted bellwether trials before the first settlement.185 More often than not, these aggregate settlement agreements
include confidentiality provisions. Confidentiality provisions withhold
information from the public that could be essential to informed decision-making, such as drugs’ potential health effects, or devices’ potential failure rates.186 That hidden information often remains unknown,
182. For example, in a case where a tire company had misled the court as to the existence of
safety tests showing a tire had a tendency to separate at high speeds with fatal results, the Supreme Court reduced sanctions to a minimal amount. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186, 1190 (2017) (limiting attorneys’ fees sanctions to those incurred
because of the discovery misconduct). In that case, the lower courts noted that protective orders
played a critical role in hiding dangers from the public.
183. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 47 (2018).
184. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. 185
(2018).
185. BURCH, supra note 93, at 256.
186. See Wagner supra note 57, at 697–98 (“Without key information on the ways in which a
product might be risky—for example, scientific research revealing that tobacco is both addictive
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however, because the inherent nature of confidential settlements prevents insight into their content.
In sum, disclosure rules fail because protective orders and parties’
sealing agreements are rarely appealed and it is in the interest of various participants in the litigation, including judges, to promote settlement over disclosure. These participants are all producing what the
courts as an institution seem to prefer: dispute resolution. The next
section considers the place of dispute resolution among the values litigation is meant to promote.
III. MODELS

FOR

REVEALING TRUTH

VIA

LITIGATION

Traditionally, the courts are viewed as having two purposes: dispute
resolution and law declaration.187 But there is a third generally recognized purpose: revealing truthful information. Truth-seeking in adjudication is usually associated with trials, but of course, trials occur in
courtrooms and therefore it can be said that a third purpose of having
public courts is getting to the truth of the matter in dispute.188 One
might be tempted to subsume this truth-seeking function in the courts’
dispute-resolution purpose; the purpose of civil discovery is often understood to be revealing information so that parties can reach an
agreement on how best to resolve their dispute. Another purpose of
civil discovery is to reveal information to avoid trial by surprise.189
Discovery in this view is merely a precursor to trial, where the important information to determining the truth of the matter will be revealed to the public. It serves the same purpose as trial: to facilitate
public decision making based on truthful information.
The history of American civil procedure helps to understand the
courts’ truth-seeking function and diagnose the problems posed by secrecy in aggregate litigation touching on public health. In earlier periods, American courts were separated into two spheres, equity and
law.190 Some causes of action and remedies were available in equity,
and carcinogenic, asbestos is carcinogenic, or a birth control device breeds lethal bacteria—regulators, the public at large, and other stakeholders cannot participate meaningfully on whether or
how to regulate products that cause harms.”).
187. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012) (discussing the two models in the context of Supreme
Court decisions to avoid decision); Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447,
470 (2009) (defending judicial issue creation as part of the judiciary’s law declaration function).
188. See generally Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101,
1103 (2006) (“The literal and material presence of adjudication stems in part from its performative qualities: much of the activity occurs in buildings open to the public.”).
189. LAHAV, supra note 53, at 67.
190. It is important to remember that these spheres were not separate in all the American
jurisdictions. American equity was arguably invented by Chancellor Kent and Justice Story. That
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others at law. Although there was some overlap, the systems were understood as different and separate, and certain ideal-type qualities
were associated with each.191 That legacy remains today although
many courts, including the federal courts, have merged law and
equity.192
We have adopted equity models of secrecy as the path to accuracy
and truth in pretrial adjudication, while simultaneously adopting the
common-law model for trials to arrive at and publicize truth. These
two approaches are at odds with one another. Recall the Supreme
Court’s assertion that “pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
public components of a civil trial” and “were not open to the public at
common law.”193 As we shall see, discovery was closed to the public in
the equity system, but not at law. The reasons behind the difference
between these two models for truth-seeking remain relevant today
and suggest an approach for doctrinal reform.
With these historical divergences in mind, we build on the doctrinal
framework described in Part I.A and the procedural pathways courts
use today to offer a more nuanced approach to transparency. Instead
of categorizing access principally upon whether the information lies
solely in the parties’ hands or in the court’s docket—the same lockstep pretrial stages that divorce lawyers and MDL lawyers alike
face—we suggest that courts focus on the type of information and proceeding at issue, as the Sixth Circuit did in hearing the Washington
Post and Charleston Gazette Mail’s appeal. Placing products-liability
proceedings within a broader spectrum that considers secrecy and
transparency interests among different kinds of cases can sharpen
courts’ focus on whether the particular information is relevant to the
common good, pushing the balance toward disclosure where public
needs support it and towards secrecy where they do not, regardless of
the lawsuit’s stage.
political history is fascinating but there is no room to delve into it here. See Stanley N. Katz, The
Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the
Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 272 (Donald Fleming &
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (describing colonists concern with crown control of equity courts).
191. For a general discussion of this overlap, see Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before
1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999, 1001 (1974) (describing various procedural methods by which courts of
law and equity shared jurisdiction in England and the American colonies). A good example of
the overlap is the feigned issue procedure. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 452 (3d ed. 1769). In this procedure, a factual issue crucial to an equitable
case would be styled as a wager, and the outcome of the wager determined by a court at law,
with the result being used in the equity court.
192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
193. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
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We begin this section by presenting equity’s model for getting at the
truth of the matter: secrecy. We then revisit the common-law model
for obtaining truthful information: the public trial. Finally, we consider an alternative framework for transparency that envisions a spectrum from secrecy to public trials as mechanisms for obtaining truthful
information depending on the underlying litigation issues.
A. Equity/Secrecy Model
Traditional equity procedure assumed that the best way to get to the
truth was to require witnesses to testify in secret. In its ideal form,
equity practice required that the judicial officer (the chancellor or an
appointed magistrate) question witnesses without anyone else present.
The officer would take notes on the witness’s testimony and neither
the lawyers nor could parties attend. This process was the equivalent
of today’s deposition. There was no cross examination, however, only
questioning conducted by a neutral arbiter. Indeed, neither the parties
nor their lawyers could find out what the witness told the judicial officer, so they could not prepare other witnesses or their own clients for
their depositions. Because no witness knew the content of the testimony of the other witnesses, no witness would be able to conform
their testimony to the narrative that would be best for their side in the
litigation. A prepared witness was considered most likely to lie. The
content of witness testimony was only released at the end of the process, at which point it could be used by either side in support of their
arguments to the magistrate for why they should win. Publishing testimony in any way terminated the process, regardless of how many
more witnesses remained to be deposed.194
This model may seem strange to the modern sensibility, but it is the
same idea behind the rules of professional responsibility requiring
lawyers to maintain client confidences. The purpose of the requirement in Model Rule 1.6 that lawyers cannot reveal information without a client’s permission is to encourage clients to be completely
candid with their lawyers.195 The attorney-client privilege in court is
based on this same idea. The thinking behind these rules is that if the
client believes that information she reveals to her lawyer may be released to anyone else, she will decide to present the lawyer with only
information that she wants released. A client who is not guaranteed
194. See generally AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIAMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877, 19–61 (2017). This paragraph
summarizes a chapter of Kessler’s book on the quasi-inquisitorial procedures of the early nineteenth century.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
GINS OF
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confidentiality is likely to hide the most damning facts. This, in turn,
hampers the lawyer’s ability to provide the best representation because quality representation requires knowing all the facts, especially
those that are not favorable to the client. In short, parts of our legal
system are based on the belief that a guarantee of secrecy best promotes candor between lawyer and client.
A similar calculus supports the rule that statements in negotiation
cannot be admitted at trial. The idea behind prohibiting introduction
of this information at trial is not that statements made in negotiations
are likely to be false or unreliable (which in any event would violate
the rules of professional responsibility). Rather, it is to promote the
most candid and truthful statements possible by protecting participants in negotiating from having concessions or other statements used
against them at trial. As in the case of the attorney-client protection,
secrecy in negotiation promotes candor between parties.
In her history of the development of American adversarial culture,
Amalia Kessler explains why a lawyer’s publicly cross-examining witnesses was considered the best test of truth and how using this device
was part of a larger movement to protect lawyers’ economic interests
and increase their social standing.196 The original equitable system required a neutral magistrate or chancellor to question witnesses. But as
the system became understaffed and overwhelmed with cases, magistrates were temporarily appointed to assist in resolving cases, replacing permanent chancellors. These magistrates were not as
independent as the chancellors had been. They began to rely on lawyer-written questions for witnesses and, in the process, magistrates became more like stenographers and less like investigators or judges.
Ultimately, lawyers were permitted to attend depositions. With magistrate independence from the lawyers thus compromised, equity came
under attack.197
At the same time, lawyers wanted greater publicity for legal proceedings to demonstrate their abilities beyond the confines of the confidential equity proceedings. The best way to publicize their work and
attract additional clients, as well as to become more prominent public
figures, was to publicly present their case at trial.198 This brings us to
the “modern” model of the lawyer as a public advocate.

196. KESSLER, supra note 194, at 151–99.
197. Id. This paragraph also summarizes a chapter in Kessler’s book in which she documents
this transformation meticulously.
198. Id.
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B. Common Law: The Trial/Publicity Model
In the nineteenth century, Kessler explains, lawyers positioned
themselves as civic leaders and advocates, comparing themselves favorably to Cicero. To create this social position, lawyers needed public
trials at which they might prove themselves. The push to publicize resolution of legal disputes, in particular the crucible of trial, was a part
of this larger attempt by the legal profession to control its destiny and
improve its standing in society. As Kessler points out, it did not have
to be this way. There were alternative models for mediating disputes
that were tried.199 Nevertheless, the public trial with lawyer arguments, reported in the press and giving lawyers an opportunity to become public figures, became a feature of the American legal
landscape.
Many of the American legal system’s features that we take for
granted were created during this period. These include the idea that
truth can be best obtained by the opposing side directly confronting
and questioning a witness in a public courtroom, the idea that parties
should run discovery rather than the judge or magistrate, and the idea
that preparing witnesses for trial is a necessary feature of civil litigation. 200
Preparing for a public trial that will never come has become the
central enterprise of American litigation. Although the trial has been
the ultimate arbiter of truth in the American system, the phenomenon
of the vanishing trial has meant that it is an increasingly rare event.201
In 2018, there were only 2,453 trials (bench and jury) out of 275,879
cases terminated in the federal system.202 In the state systems, the trial
rate (bench and jury) is around 2 to 4% of filings.203 Most cases are
resolved by judges or settlement without a public trial and most lawyer time, to the extent it is expended at all, is spent on activities such
199. Id. at 263–322 (describing the attempts to use alternatives to adversarialism in the Freedmen’s Bureau immediately after the Civil War).
200. See generally id.
201. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004).
202. UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 112.
203. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Trial Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System,
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, June 2005, at 1. In Florida in 2018, jury and bench trials constituted 4%
of the cases resolved by the courts. To search the Florida trial court statistics, see Trial Court
Statistics, FLA. OFF. ST. COURTS ADMIN., http://trialstats.flcourts.org/. In Connecticut the number of cases resolved by trial in fiscal year 2018–19 was 4% of the total filings. Civil Case Movement, STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/civil/CaseDoc_1819.pdf.
In New York, the number was 2.5%. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., 2018, at
40.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL208.txt

384

unknown

Seq: 40

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:48

[Vol. 70:345

as motion practice and civil discovery. Discovery itself is fairly limited
in most cases, but not in the complex litigation discussed here.204
The idea that discovery should be private makes sense in a world
where the expectation is that relevant information will be revealed at
a public trial through a talented lawyer’s performance. Even the idea
that no discovery would be conducted, a feature of earlier iterations of
common-law litigation, is consistent with the truth-seeking model if
there is a trial where this information is revealed. But today’s system
is far different from the one for which lawyers advocated in the nineteenth century. Despite this fact, the system has labored under the
illusion that trials are the publicity moment, and the rules governing
disclosure are geared toward this assumption. The rules are made for
the lawyer statesman preparing for a public performance, but they
govern a very different process.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect the idea that the time
for publishing information is at trial, or perhaps as part of a dispositive
motion that has taken the place of trial in the modern system. A seldom discussed provision of Rule 5 forbids filing discovery materials
absent a court order—the opposite of its original requirement that “all
discovery materials must be filed with the district court, unless the
court orders otherwise.”205 Indeed, until December 1980, there was a
presumption of public access not just to judicial records, but to discovery documents themselves (even when courts did not use them in adjudicating the dispute).206 As the 1980 Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules contemplated changing Rule 5(d), the New York Times editorial desk warned:
Unless Congress moves quickly, Federal judges will soon gain the
power to prevent public access to a huge number of documents that
now belong to the record . . . So significant a policy should not be
brought in through the back door. The judiciary complains that
mountains of discovery material - pretrial evidence gathered by adversaries from each other’s witnesses - are accumulating in clerks’
offices and reference rooms . . . One would think that Congress
204. Barbara J. Rothstein & Catherine R. Borden, Managing Multidistrict Litigation in Products Liability Cases: A Pocket Guide for Transferee Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., 2011, at 33 (“The
volume of discovery in a products liability MDL often warrants creation of physical and/or electronic document depositories, a website or sites, and other means of making discovery materials
available to all parties.”).
205. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987). See also FED. R.
CIV. P. 5(d)(1)(A) (“[D]isclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery requests and responses must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders
filing: depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents or tangible things or to permit entry
onto land, and requests for admission.”). Thanks to Adam Zimmerman for pointing us to this
Rule.
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (1980 Advisory Comm. Notes).
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could solve a storage problem at lesser cost to the values of
justice.207

In response, Judge Walter Mansfield, the Chairman of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, explained that secrecy was not the committee’s intent. Rule 5(d) “would require [parties to file discovery materials] unless the court, either on motion of the parties to a case or on its
own motion, decided . . . that the public interest would not be served
by the filing of a mass of material in that case.”208 The Advisory Committee echoed this sentiment, recognizing a desire to permit access to
discovery materials, especially by “members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally.”209
And courts listened: in upholding Judge Weinstein’s decision to unseal Agent Orange documents, the Second Circuit cited both Rule 5(d)
and Judge Mansfield’s letter in ruling that “Rule 5(d), far from being a
housekeeping rule, embodies the Committee’s concern that class action litigants and the general public be afforded access to discovery
materials whenever possible.”210 It further noted that “access is particularly appropriate when the subject matter of the litigation is of especial public interest.”211
It wasn’t until 2000 that the Advisory Committee perfected a complete about-face, amending the rule to forbid the filing of discovery to
save court costs.212 If discovery materials are never filed and no dispositive motion requires their attachment, there is no way for the public to learn any important information contained in these documents
other than a party’s decision to publicize them.
The fact that the federal rule makers so cavalierly forbade the filing
of discovery materials might be taken to mean that the model of civil
litigation they had adopted was exclusively devoted to dispute resolution to the exclusion of other important values such as truth-seeking.
The dominant approach to civil litigation during the period after
1980,213 the promotion of settlement, must have factored into this decision. But the federal courts’ own understanding of the vanishing trial
phenomenon and its implications seems to have surfaced only re207. Paper Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1980, at A18.
208. Walter R. Mansfield, Letter to the Editor, To Lift Paper Mountains Off the U.S. Court
System, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1980.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (1980 Advisory Comm. Notes).
210. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d at 146.
211. Id. Note that this presumption in favor of public access disappeared when the advisory
committee changed course in 2000. SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n.11 (2d Cir. 2001).
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000 Advisory Comm. Notes).
213. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Inquiry: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 925 (2000).
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cently, perhaps as late as 2005. The system’s conception of itself in
2000 may still have been that important information would be revealed at trial, so that there was no need to burden the system with
public filings pretrial.
But today’s world is one with almost no trials and little pretrial publicity. Our ideas of how publicity and transparency should work need
to change as well.
C. A Spectrum of Transparency
As Part II.B explained, transferee judges have shown a greater aptitude and appetite for getting involved—sometimes quite heavily—in
the mass-tort settlement process. Yet judges’ willingness to roll up
their sleeves and wade into parties’ settlement discussions should not
blind them to competing public values. Placing mass torts within a
broader spectrum that considers secrecy and transparency interests
among different kinds of cases can sharpen courts’ focus on whether
particular information is relevant to the common good without eliminating judicial flexibility and discretion to use secrecy to promote
truth telling. It also highlights the limitations of a trans-substantive or
one-size-fits-all approach to transparency in civil litigation.
We begin with two simple archetypes that fall easily into the private-public distinction. First, assume D runs a stop sign at an intersection and hits P. P hires an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and sues
for compensatory damages. Along the way, P’s attorney engages in
settlement discussions with D’s lawyer and eventually they settle. This
is a quintessential private scenario: an individual hires a private attorney to sue over negligent conduct that adversely affected her, her only
proof of wrongdoing pointed solely to D’s actions, and that evidence
had no bearing on other car accidents (or products) elsewhere.
Now assume that State A’s attorney general sues State B over the
right to divert and use water.214 This is a classic public scenario: an
attorney general sues to vindicate its citizens’ public interest, the attorney general is paid a salary out of public funds, and the information
obtained in litigation is relevant to a public asset. The public has a
right to know what government actors (including judges) are doing,
and the media may report regular updates. These basic archetypes
map easily into the following matrix:
214. E.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506–07 (1932) (“[T]he decree must be taken as
determining the relative rights of the two States, including their respective citizens, to divert and
use the waters of the Laramie and its tributaries.”). See also Diego A. Zambrano, Discovery as
Regulation, 119 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2020) (describing cases).
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TABLE 1. PUBLIC-PRIVATE ARCHETYPES

Litigant
Attorney
Claim

Private
Secret
Individual
Private attorney
Negligence

Public
Transparent
Citizens
State attorney general
Water rights

Between the public and private litigation described above lies a
spectrum of disputes. Understanding the ideal types helps anchor the
ends of the public-private spectrum. Tort suits—and the need for access to the underlying public health and safety information that may
stem from them—are best understood as a fluid mix along a continuum that can serve private and public functions depending on the lawsuit’s subject matter.215 For example, discovery into what may seem
like a one-off case involving a lemon car could reveal a product defect.
That defect could affect many but still be a relatively minor one with
respect to public health, such as a faulty interior light, or it could be a
very serious threat, such as a defective airbag or ignition switch. Table
2 depicts a spectrum of transparency:

215. Professor Rubenstein likens the private attorney general concept to Alfred Kinsey’s taxonomy of sexual orientations and points out that “[t]here are not just two pure forms—the private attorney on the one hand and the government attorney on the other—but rather an array of
mixes of the public and private.” William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General”
Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2132 (2004).
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TRANSPARENCY

Private

Public

Secrecy

Transparency

Litigant

Individual

Individual

Individuals

Attorney

Private attorney

Private attorney

Private attorPrivate attorneys & court- ney general
appointed lead
lawyers

Evidence

Bears only on
D’s one-time
conduct toward this P

Pattern of
conduct by D
or conduct that
affects more
than just P

Pattern of
conduct by D
or conduct that
affects more
than just P

Primary
Goals

Compensation, Compensation, Compensation, Compensation, Regulatory,
Regulatory,
Restitution
Restitution
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence,
Compensation

Exemplary Negligence,
wrongful
Claims
death, breach
of contract

Examples

Car accident

Class members The Public
Private attorney general
working for
State AG or
local governments

D’s conduct
Pattern of
conduct by D affects the
or conduct that public
affects more
than just P

The Public
State attorney general

D’s conduct affects
the public

Individual suits
over employment discrimination, personal injury,
products liability

Mass torts
(products
liability, defective design,
mislabeling)

Securities,
antitrust,
consumer
protection,
employment
discrimination,
civil rights

Public
Public nuisance, RICO, nuisance
antitrust,
environmental
harms

Bus accident,
early GM
ignition switch
suits, early
individual
tobacco suits,
early individual opioid suits

Vioxx, Pelvic
Mesh, GM
MDL

NAS babies’
medical monitoring claims

Tobacco,
Opioids

Water
rights,
Human
trafficking,
Opioids

As disputes move from the private realm into the public, the courts’
obligations to guard the broader public interest should likewise grow
stronger. Presumptions in favor of public access exist throughout litigation, and as disputes move to the right of the spectrum, it makes
sense to require countervailing interests to be increasingly compelling
before an order to seal documents will be issued, even in a suit’s early
stages.216
It is important to understand that Table 2 presents a spectrum, not a
dichotomy or threshold. Applying a threshold analysis to confidentiality orders risks overlooking important public-health and safety information that may arise in the middle categories (such as individual suits
with public-health implications, MDLs, or class actions). Early GM
ignition-switch plaintiffs like Brooke Melton’s family, as well as the
216. See Doré, supra note 94, at 320 (“[A] court’s decision to rely upon the Constitution as
opposed to the common law apparently influences only the strength of any presumption of public access and the showing of confidentiality necessary to rebut that presumption.”).
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subsequent MDL devoted to those claims, provide straightforward examples. 217
There may be a temptation to categorize suits by government actors, for example, as in the public interest requiring increased transparency. Indeed, courts have found an even stronger right of access
when the government is a party in a proceeding.218 Because the work
of private attorneys and public attorneys general overlaps today to
such an extent, drawing this distinction is nearly impossible. The rise
of the “private attorney general” is but one example of this overlap.219
These lawyers represent individual clients (sometimes as named class
representatives, sometimes in informal or consolidated aggregations),
and at the same time, supplement regulators’ efforts.220
This is not an area that is amenable to categorical rules. A rule-like
or threshold approach to confidentiality is likely to be over or underinclusive. Courts need to pay attention to differences between suits in
order to make judgments about transparency. And a simple default
rule in favor of privacy for discovery information has proven problematic, as illustrated earlier.
Nor can courts be sanguine that involving a public entity or attorney
general will necessarily yield greater transparency without judicial
oversight. State attorneys general not only pursue clear governmental
interests like water rights, but also litigate ill-defined quasi-sovereign
217. Meier & Stout, supra note 42.
218. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 271 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The interest of the public and
press in access to civil proceeding is at its apex when the government is a part to the litigation.
Indeed, the public has a strong interest in monitoring not only functions of the courts but also
the positions that its elected officials and government agencies take in litigation.”); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The appropriateness of making court
files accessible is accentuated in cases where the government is a party: in such circumstances,
the public’s right to know what the executive branch is about coalesces with the concomitant
right of the citizenry to appraise the judicial branch.”).
219. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 110 (2006); According to
Professor Steve Yeazell, the notion of a “private attorney general” originated from Professors
Kalven and Rosenfeld’s 1941 scholarship. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 232 (1987) (referring to Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 721 (1941)).
220. Of course, this isn’t “neat” or without controversy. For a range of roles that private attorney generals play, see Rubenstein supra note 215, at 2142–55. For other critiques, see John H.
Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1441, 1451 (2005) (noting the theory that class action lawyers serving as private attorneys general
is appropriate only if attorneys act like and achieve the same results as a true public servant
would); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing The Private Attorney General: Why The Model of The
Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983) (“The conventional
theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of private litigation is not simply to
secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence . . .”).
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claims that range from environmental and antitrust claims221 to more
adventurous areas like suits against tobacco companies, lead paint
manufacturers, gun manufacturers, health maintenance organizations,
and various opioid defendants.222 At times, state attorneys general
also privatize these suits, opting to hire the same contingent-fee lawyers who typically sue on individuals’ behalf to represent the state.
This Article opened with two such examples—Kentucky’s opioid suit
and Minnesota’s tobacco suit.223
Rather than presuming that party-held discovery is private, as is the
current rule,224 courts should pay closer attention to the information
at issue and the suit’s potential impact along the spectrum from public
to private. Distinguishing between discovery and judicial records does
not produce the kind of transparency that best serves the public, as
the Sixth Circuit recognized. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s decisions on
tobacco and opioids are good examples of a court making inroads
based on public-health concerns. They considered the cases’ unique
circumstances rather than taking a categorical approach concerned
only with the litigation’s phase or the type of motion at issue.
In the past, courts better understood the potential for discovery to
be in the public interest. Recall Judge Mansfield’s letters to Congress
and to the New York Times promising the public and the legislature
that the Advisory Committee’s change to Rule 5(d) was designed to
deal with mountains of paper—not to undermine the courts’ commitment to transparent discovery, particularly when those documents
were of “public importance.”225 It was on this authority that the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Weinstein’s decision to unseal documents
that the parties agreed to keep confidential in the Agent Orange litigation.226 Regrettably, this past commitment to transparency in partyheld discovery has all but disappeared in many federal circuits.227
221. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982); 13A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3d § 3531.11, at
19 (1984).
222. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3043, 3072–73 (2013) (citing cases); Jan Hoffman, States Clash With Cities Over Potential Opioids
Settlement Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/health/
opioids-litigation-settlement.html.
223. Armstrong, supra note 7; Belluck, supra note 15.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing both
letters).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1076 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[N]othing in Rule 26(c)—
either standing alone or when read in conjunction with the current version of Rule 5(d)—confers
substantive rights upon third parties seeking access to the fruits of discovery.”); SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n.11 (2d Cir. 2001) (abrogating Agent Orange and noting that the
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One lesson of the Opiate litigation should be a renewed commitment to scrutinize confidentiality orders. Pressing public concerns can
pop up not just in suits by state attorneys general, but across many
different types of cases, particularly in aggregate or class litigation
where large numbers of consumers or patients have been impacted by
a single course of conduct. To the extent that the categorical line between party-held discovery and judicial records makes sense in some
contexts, such as cases on the private end of the spectrum in Table 2,
we question whether the distinction is appropriate in mass-tort MDLs.
In creating an MDL, seven judges have already decided that the
scale of those affected by the allegations warrants federal coordination. Yet, sending those cases to a single federal judge for centralized
pretrial proceedings means that there are fewer opportunities for both
trials and dispositive motions.228 Consequently, under the current
sealing regime in most circuits, the vast majority of information unearthed in these high-profile disputes will remain party-held and private. In one dataset of products-liability MDLs, 55.8% of transferee
judges did not conduct bellwether trials before the first settlement occurred.229 To be sure, the fact that 61.7% of transferee judges ruled on
summary-judgment motions and 67.6% ruled on Daubert motions
before the first settlement is more encouraging.230 But nearly onethird (ten out of thirty-four proceedings) ended in private, aggregate
settlements before the transferee judge ever held a bellwether trial or
ruled on summary judgment, Daubert, or class certification.231 Without dispositive motions or trials, critical public health and safety information may remain in the exclusive control of those who stand to
profit from keeping it secret.
This leaves us with a single, pressing question: is the truth-seeking
value in the civil justice system being fulfilled in mass-tort MDLs? The
Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he publicity of a judicial proceeding
is a requirement of much broader bearing than its mere effect upon
2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) “provides no presumption of filing all discovery materials, let
alone public access to them”).
228. If the trial rate is approximately 2%, in a 10,000 case MDL we would expect around 200
trials. But that is unimaginable in the current regime. Were litigation to occur in multiple, dispersed federal jurisdictions, parties would surely seek slightly different discovery depending on
case specifics. Duplicative discovery would occur, yes, but multiple motions would likewise increase the opportunities for information about the underlying allegations to surface. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TULANE
L. REV. 2369 (2008) (arguing in favor of multiple, regional MDLs).
229. BURCH, supra note 93, at 256.
230. Id. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (articulating standard for acceptance of expert testimony).
231. Id.
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the quality of testimony.”232 Open access plays a “significant community therapeutic value” by laying bare the “means used to achieve justice” such that the public can see and accept “both the process and its
results.”233 Thus, “[t]he crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can
occur if justice is ‘done in a corner [or] in any covert manner.’”234
Extending this reasoning to the civil realm in the tobacco cases, the
Sixth Circuit recognized that “public access provides a check on
courts[,]” for “[j]udges know that they will continue to be held responsible by the public for their rulings[,]” whereas “secrecy insulates the
participants, masking impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption.”235
Transparency also has a role to play in allowing the public to monitor judges and their surrogates. As we noted in Part II.B, transferee
judges play a prominent, hands-on role in promoting settlement. Even
absent Rule 23’s power to officially bless aggregate settlements,
judges are signaling (sometimes with a heavy hand) that plaintiffs
should enter into a private settlement program.236 And to assist them,
transferee judges frequently in-source mediators, special masters, and
“settlement” masters from for-profit arbitration companies like
JAMS.237 When court-appointed private-sector lawyers play a role in
adjudication and settlement, they lack the accountability of a public
official and can raise questions about capture, bias, and self-interest.238 Thus, there is a pressing need for public access to maintain
courts’ legitimacy, yet little is known about these private actors’ work
behind the scenes.239
The presumptions of party-held discovery and private settlement do
not fit well with the structure of the mass-tort MDL, where media and
regulator access to information that affects public health is crucially
important, and where public access serves as a check on judicial behavior and decision-making.240 As settlements regularly eclipse trials,
232. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (quoting 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1834, at 435 (J. Chadbourn ed., 1976)).
233. Id. at 570–71.
234. Id. at 571.
235. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178–79 (6th Cir. 1983).
236. BURCH, supra note 93, at 113–18.
237. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial Adjuncts in Multidistrict Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2174–76 (2020).
238. Id. at 2206–14.
239. Id. at 2188 (finding that even compensation information was either undisclosed or affirmatively for 62% of private judicial adjuncts).
240. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1178 (“[P]ublic access provides a
check on courts. Judges know that they will continue to be held responsible by the public for
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courts’ obligations to promote public discourse and truth revelation,
safeguard public health and safety, explain and give life to public values, and clarify and define the law through transparent reasoning—
traditional features of public adjudication—increases.241
Just as courts paved common-law paths to protect public access to
summary judgment documents, reasoning that summary judgment
substitutes for trials, so too should courts recognize the modern-day
realities of mass-tort MDLs. There, not only does summary judgment
become the new trial, but settlement can become the new summary
judgment. Transparency and public access should not be forgotten in
these important cases just because the system has caused adjudicatory
opportunities to decline. High-profile lawsuits like the Opiate litigation give courts an opportunity to rethink the existing disclosure regime and adopt a more nuanced view of discovery with greater
attention to the public interest in the important area of drug-and-device regulation.
These observations should spur courts to rethink the presumption
that the same dichotomy of public judicial filings and private discovery documents should apply to all cases, which in turn requires questioning the presumption of trans-substantivity. The confidentiality
rules, while informed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are also
common-law rules. They can be altered to reflect the particular content of litigation over which the judge is presiding. Mass-tort MDLs
often implicate the general public’s health and safety. This is true not
only in cases like opioids where the journalists intervene to obtain
information, but also in cases such as the GM ignition-switch litigation
and suits involving alleged abuse of the FDA’s drug-and-device approval system. Judges ought not wait until a journalist or public-interest organization intervenes to take these considerations into account.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes litigation produces information that is a common good.
This is frequently the case in mass-tort MDLs, which often involve
products, drugs, and medical devices that are alleged to endanger the
health and safety of many. Yet, having been produced in the context
their rulings. Without access to the proceedings, the public cannot analyze and critique the reasoning of the court.”); Spector et al., supra note 51 (“ ‘It’s a catch-22,’ said David Friedman, a
former NHTSA official. If documents and other evidence in litigation are sealed, ‘how are you
supposed to know about them?’ Friedman said. ‘If you don’t know about them, you can’t get
them.’ ”).
241. Judith Resnik, Whose Judgement? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527
(1994).
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of binary litigation on the purely private side of the spectrum, the current rules for public disclosure are not a good fit in MDLs.
These rules have their origins in the separation of law and equity
and the different approaches to truth seeking that characterized those
two systems. The judicial system’s current preference for dispute resolution along the lines of a transactional model promotes secrecy to
facilitate mass-tort deals, much like the equity system did in the nineteenth century. Still, in many cases, courts recognize the importance of
disclosing information obtained in discovery to promote the common
good. The mistaken belief that this information might still surface at
trial has been a stumbling block to reform. Indeed, it is this mistaken
belief that underlies the current legal regime, characterized by a singular approach that distinguishes between discovery (private) and dispositive motions (public). The rules of discovery confidentiality pay
too little attention to information as a common good, which may
never be publicized absent court action.
A better approach would be to think of transparency as a spectrum,
rather than a categorical choice, and to tailor confidentiality orders to
the public interest at issue. This will require judicial discretion. Hard
cases will abound, especially in mass torts that lie on the public-private divide. Nevertheless, a more nuanced approach that accounts for
differences in litigation types is more likely to result in the release of
beneficial information, hopefully on a faster timeframe than the four
years it took for Kentucky courts to release the Sackler deposition.

